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Abstract 
This paper starts with the assumption that the EU will decide to open accession negotiations with Turkey 
at the end of 2004 and in this context it explores the potential for the integration of EU and Turkish 
foreign, security and defence policies in the pre-accession period. The evolving nature of both the EU 
and Turkey as foreign policy actors is considered, with attention drawn to the effective graduations in 
the nature of the EU’s external borders as it extends its membership and association arrangements deeper 
into the south-eastern periphery. Turkish capabilities are reviewed, ranging from the subjective 
arguments about its experience as a democratising, secular state of largely Muslim culture, through to 
objective assets such as military capabilities and cultural affinities with various neighbouring peoples. 
With the Turkish neighbourhood thus becoming the EU’s wider neighbourhood, the paper reviews how 
far the EU and Turkey may be convergent in their interests and complementary in their capabilities in 
such regions as the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East and Central Asia. The paper concludes with 
the assessment that Turkey stands to be an unequivocal asset for the EU’s external policies. 
Michael Emerson is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels. 
Nathalie Tocci is a Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute, Florence. We would like to thank 
individuals interviewed in the course of preparing this paper, including participants in a seminar discussion of an 
earlier draft in Istanbul in March 2004. 
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∗ 
1. Introduction 
Even if Turkey begins its accession negotiations sometime in 2005, full membership would probably 
only occur around a decade later. Turkey needs to implement fundamental political and economic 
reforms that would assure its full compliance with the 1993 Copenhagen criteria as well as complete 
31 chapters of negotiations over the acquis communautaire with the European Commission. For its 
part, the EU needs to finalise and implement the results of the Convention and most critically it must 
absorb at least 12 new member states (the ten new members as of May 2004 plus Romania and 
Bulgaria). Of key importance indeed is the absorption capacity of the EU to take on new members, a 
capacity that has for the time being been stretched to the limit by the enlargement of May 2004.  
Yet none of this excludes the idea that the EU and Turkey might begin to integrate their foreign 
policies in the pre-accession period. In principle integration in the foreign policy realm could take 
place and would be mutually beneficial regardless of Turkey’s EU-accession process. But owing to 
Turkey’s aspirations to join the Union and the EU’s decision in 1999 to recognise Turkey as a 
candidate, a proposal for limited integration would be rejected by Turkey. In all likelihood, Turkey 
would view such a proposal as constituting an alternative strategy motivated by a rejection of Turkey 
as a European country. It would consider this rejection as backtracking by the EU from its 
commitment to recognise Turkey’s candidacy and an exclusion of Turkey for reasons that go beyond 
its compliance with the Copenhagen criteria.  
Hence, the working hypothesis of this paper is that there would be a decision to integrate Turkish and 
EU foreign policy alongside the accession negotiations rather than as a substitute for full membership. 
Indeed, in the event of a positive decision on the opening of accession negotiations in December 2004, 
there could be good reasons for integration in the foreign policy sphere with deliberate vigour 
immediately from 2005. Such integration could yield important benefits to both Turkey and to the EU.  
In fact this process has already begun with Turkey’s association with the EU’s nascent security and 
defence policy. In October 2002 an agreement was reached concerning the participation of non-EU 
NATO allies in the European security and defence policy (ESDP).
1 These arrangements were 
elaborated further in the context of the EU-NATO Strategic Partnership initiated in December 2002. In 
practice, Turkey has participated in all EU-led military operations, apart from the operation in the 
Republic of Congo.  
But this is only a small beginning compared to the conceivable agenda. The reasons to consider this 
idea are quite obvious at the primary level. First, Turkey’s neighbourhood in the eastern 
Mediterranean, the Balkans, the Middle East and Eurasian regions is the primary focus of Turkish 
foreign policy and has become the main source of Europe’s security concerns: weapons of mass 
destruction, terrorism and illegal trafficking of drugs and people. These were identified as priority 
                                                                 
*
∗ The authors would like to thank Sinan Ulgen as well as the staff of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 
valuable information and ideas. 
1 See European Council (2002), ESDP: Implementation of the Nice provisions by the non-EU NATO Allies, 24-
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areas in the European security strategy adopted by the EU in December 2003.
2 Second, the enlarging 
EU is in the course of developing a European Neighbourhood policy,
3 which would be extended 
naturally to the east with Turkey’s accession, becoming to a considerable degree a Euro-Turkish 
Neighbourhood policy. Third, Turkey offers a number of specific potential assets for helping the EU 
address these concerns, ranging from the concrete realities of location and logistics, through to matters 
of culture and ideology and the search for a harmony rather than clash of civilisations.  
The present paper starts by considering some working hypotheses on what kind of polities Turkey and 
the EU may tend to become over the next decade. On the basis of such hypotheses, this paper delves 
more precisely into the foreign policy implications and opportunities of a Turkey fully integrated into 
the European Union. The approach is first to conceptually identify the possible assets (and liabilities) 
that Turkey’s accession to the EU could bring in the foreign policy domain, and then to test these ideas 
in relation to the most relevant geographical theatres of operation for a putative joint foreign policy. In 
doing so, the implications for the EU itself as a foreign policy actor in its near-abroad are also 
assessed.  
Some aspects of the Turkish candidacy are manifestly controversial in Europe, or have to balance 
between positives and negatives. In the realm of foreign, security and defence policies, however, we 
do not find that this is the case, and by the end of the paper we arrive at unambiguously positive 
conclusions. To crystallise the conclusions with some imagery, we may see Turkey as both a 
bridgehead and spearhead for European interests, here interpreted in a civil rather than military sense.
4 
2.  The evolving nature of Turkey and the EU: The spectrum of 
hypotheses 
What kind of European Union will Turkey join? On 1 May 2004 ten new member states entered the 
Union. The road map for accession of the two remaining Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs), namely Romania and Bulgaria, is foreseen in 2007. In addition, Croatia applied for 
membership in 2003 and Macedonia followed in March 2004. Other Western Balkan countries are 
currently in the Stabilisation and Association Process, which was explicitly recognised by the June 
2003 Thessaloniki European Council to lead on to the full accession process. To this long and 
problematic list one should add also Moldova, which is increasingly oriented less towards Russia, 
aiming instead at joining the Stabilisation and Association Process, and so to join the long EU-
accession train. Ukraine and the South Caucasus states are likely to press harder for the ‘prospect’ of 
EU membership in the long term, especially if Turkey begins accession negotiations in 2005. Finally, 
the idea that Norway and Iceland will submit applications for membership in the course of the next 
several years should not be excluded, in which case they would almost certainly receive a fast-track 
treatment, given that they are already fully compliant with the Copenhagen criteria. Where in this long 
queue of applications will Turkey find its place? The conventional argument is that it already has its 
place immediately after Bulgaria and Romania. Apart from the possible cases of Norway and Iceland, 
however, other applicants such as Croatia may fancy their chances to jump the queue ahead of Turkey, 
which is not unthinkable for a small and relatively unproblematic candidature.  
What are the implications of this cascading enlargement process for the nature of the Union? Specific 
predictions are impossible to make. Nevertheless, two contrasting hypotheses can be put forward.
5 
Will the EU look more like a classical, federal Westphalian state or a neo-medieval empire? Rather 
                                                                 
2 See Javier Solana (2003), A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, European 
Commission, Brussels, 11-12 December (retrievable from http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/78367.pdf). 
3 See European Commission (2004), European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy Paper, Brussels, May. 
4 A bridgehead is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “a fortification covering the end of a bridge 
nearest the enemy” and a spearhead as “a body of persons chosen to lead a thrust or attack”.  
5 See Jan Zielonka (2001), “How new enlarged borders will reshape the European Union”, Journal of Common 
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than representing mutually exclusive options, these models represent stylised extremes in a wide 
spectrum of possibilities. The current EU already includes elements of both models. The paragraphs 
below speculate on the possible direction the Union’s structure will take along this spectrum.  
The first, Westphalian hypothesis would see the emergence of a supranational level of government as 
a clear federal centre of authority. It would acquire new competences as well as a serious deepening of 
some presently thin competences. It would be able to exercise them over a well-defined territory. It 
would be equipped with common military and police forces to assure the internal and external security 
of the European federation. There would be a coincidence of legal, administrative, economic and 
military regimes. As such there would be a categorical distinction between the inside and the outside. 
Essential sovereignty would be regained, having passed from the national state to the European super-
state level.  
The second, neo-medieval empire hypothesis would see a Union developing as a set of overlapping 
circles, without a clear centre of power or hierarchy. Its borders would be soft and in a state of flux. Its 
institutional structure would be even more complex than the one we know today. This in turn would 
force the Union to act in a differentiated rather than a uniform manner. As put by one political 
scientist, the medieval system of rule reflected a “patchwork of overlapping and incomplete rights of 
governments” in which “different juridical instances were geographically interwoven and stratified, 
and plural allegiances, asymmetrical suzerainties and anomalous enclaves abounded”.
6 A Union of 
possibly over 30 member states may come to look like an increasingly post-modern equivalent of such 
a system.
7 Its sovereignty would be divided, its citizenship would be diversified and its institutions 
would be multiple and interlocked in a complex web of interdependences.  
A new medieval empire could take a variety of forms, which would render the Union more or less 
inclusive as well as more or less effective. For example, how would the concentric or overlapping 
circles of the Union be constituted? Would an exclusive group of ‘first-class’ members proceed with a 
tightly-knit political core, excluding the participation of outer circles of ‘second-class’ member states? 
Or would the Union be formed by different cores for different policy areas, which are determined by 
the voluntary opt-ins and opt-outs of the different countries? The effectiveness of the new structure 
would also vary widely depending on the chosen mode of decision-making within EU structures. For 
example, a Union constituted by overlapping circles deciding on the basis of majority rule could well 
be more effective than a classic federation, which would retain the possibility of minority blocking 
power.  
Three reasons suggest that the kind of Union that Turkey would be most likely to join would resemble 
a neo-medieval system more than a grand, federal Westphalian state. First, owing to the fundamental 
nature of the ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004 and the further expected enlargement to the Balkans, the 
Union is likely to be characterised by increasing degrees and forms of divergence. Despite the 
impressive transformation observed in the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe, 
considerable divergence persists between the old and new members.
8 The single market will enlarge 
but still with long transition periods for the full liberalisation of the four freedoms. Pressures 
emanating from the movement of persons may render the objective of establishing hard EU borders 
impossible. The Schengen system, as we know it today, is problematic in generating hard borders 
between the inside and the outside. These borders are being erected in regions where for decades 
border peoples freely interacted on a regular basis. Retaining such a system of inclusion/exclusion is 
not only undesirable but may also be unfeasible. Finally, in the security field, because of the strong 
pro-American sentiment among the CEECs and the value accorded by them to NATO, the latter may 
well remain a principal security actor in the wider Europe.  
                                                                 
6 See John Ruggie (1986), “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity”, World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 1, 
pp. 21-52. 
7 See James Caporaso (1996), “The EU and forms of state: Westphalian, regulatory and post-modern”, Journal 
of Common Market Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 29-51. 
8 See Jan Zielonka (2001), op. cit.  6 | EMERSON & TOCCI 
 
Second, although EU institutions remain reluctant to admit it, the Union already includes overlapping 
circles constituted by inside and outside actors. The UK, Sweden and Denmark remain outside the 
eurozone. It is doubtful that all the new member states will succeed in acceding to monetary union 
after 2006. Different concepts of European economic areas beyond the EU’s formal membership exist 
already, and are becoming more numerous and diversified. For example, Norway and Switzerland are 
part of the European Economic Area and Turkey is part of the EU customs union. In the area of justice 
and home affairs, non-EU countries such as Norway are included in the Schengen system, 
participating in these EU councils albeit without voting power. Nevertheless, member states such as 
the UK have chosen not to. Likewise the newly acceding CEECs are not yet fully part of the Schengen 
area. In the area of security and defence, former Western European Union (WEU) non-EU member 
states such as Turkey and Norway may participate in ESDP decision-making as agreed in December 
2002. In the realm of foreign policy, ad hoc groups, normally consisting of France, Germany and the 
UK, often conduct joint diplomatic initiatives without the other member states. The joint initiative in 
Iran in 2003 was indeed conducted in the name of Europe and was considered an important success in 
European foreign policy. Finally, the UK’s decision in May 2004 to ratify the Constitution by 
referendum already provokes contingency thinking about what if the result there, or in other member 
states, is negative. One line of thinking is indeed to form a core group of member states who are 
included in every policy area – with no opt-outs – and to have other institutional arrangements for the 
member states that do opt-out.  
Third, the EU’s present efforts to develop a European Neighbourhood policy represents a means 
(albeit still embryonic) to dilute the gap between full membership and EU external relations. The 
Commission’s recent strategy paper extends the geographical coverage of this initiative potentially to 
all the European CIS states (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the South Caucasus) and to the 
whole of the Mediterranean basin, i.e. to all Barcelona-process states, although it does not include two 
of Turkey’s neighbours, namely Iraq and Iran.
9 
The precise form and effectiveness of the new system remains uncertain. The Union has been 
experiencing great difficulties in negotiating a well-structured Constitutional Treaty and the outcome 
is still uncertain. Hence, although enlargement raises the importance of devising a workable and 
effective decision-making system, it remains unclear whether, how and in what time-frame this will 
take place. What seems clearer is that the Union will not resemble a model of clear-cut concentric 
circles constituted by first- and second-class members. Member states and particularly the newcomers 
into the Union (including Turkey at a future date) will vigorously oppose the development of such a 
system, understandably viewing it as a form of discrimination and persisting exclusion despite their 
efforts to join the Union.  
Regardless of the precise nature of the future system, if the Westphalian model is not seriously 
pursued, rather than representing a liability divergence may act as an important asset to the new EU 
system. Diversity within the Union would not only entail greater cultural, social and political wealth 
within the EU, the differences between EU member states and non-member states would become less 
clear-cut. This in turn could aid the Union to constructively develop its relations with the ‘outside’, 
making use of the commonalities and special ties that exist between some member states and some 
neighbouring countries. As the geographical sections below will argue, this would be especially true in 
the case of Turkey and its neighbours. So long as common interests prevail, Turkey’s specificities 
could considerably enrich the possibilities for an effective and substantial EU foreign policy. Naturally 
this does not detract from the complexity of developing a workable institutional set-up to conduct 
external relations with non-member countries. This indeed remains the major challenge posed by 
enlargement in general.  
What kind of Turkey will enter the Union over the next decade? As put by most observers of Turkey, 
‘there are many Ankaras’. The multi-faceted nature of the Turkish establishment relates to different 
visions of the Turkish nation-state. Owing to the transformative (or Europeanising) nature of the 
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accession process, the often contrasting objectives of the different Ankaras became particularly 
evident following the December 1999 Helsinki European Council. Turkey’s candidacy meant that it 
was no longer sufficient to pay lip-service to the goal of EU membership. If Ankara was serious in its 
aspirations to join the Union, it had to demonstrate that it was equally committed to its domestic 
reforms in the political, economic and institutional realms.  
As the EU demands for reform became more intense, the concerns and resistance against change in 
Ankara also emerged more visibly. Effective opposition to EU membership, or rather to the reform 
necessary to attain it, existed within many groups of the Turkish political system. It included circles in 
the nationalist right and the nationalist left, along with the civilian and the military establishments. 
Some right-wing nationalists preferred to establish closer links with Turkic Eurasia than to see 
Turkey’s full integration with Western Europe. Conservatives objected to the principles and 
applications of multiculturalism and multi-level governance within the EU. Others opposed the rising 
interference of Brussels in Turkish domestic politics and were more inclined to pursue Turkey’s 
Western orientation through closer ties with the US. 
Important pro-European and pro-reformists elements also existed within the Turkish establishment, as 
shown by the fundamental constitutional reforms undertaken since October 2001. But the momentum 
in favour of change rose to unprecedented levels after the AK party’s landslide victory in the 3 
November 2002 elections. This was because of both the nature of the AKP and the very fact that the 
party gained sufficient votes to form a stable single-party government – the first since the Turgut Özal 
governments of the 1980s. The AKP refuses to define itself as a religious party but rather calls for 
greater religious freedoms. In order to carry a consistent political message it advocates individual 
rights and freedoms in other spheres as well. Its support for EU membership is not only viewed as an 
end to be attained through painful reforms. In the government’s rhetoric, the EU anchor is also 
portrayed a means to attain the objectives of reform, which are as, if not more, important than 
membership itself.
10 Indeed, government officials have repeatedly dubbed the Copenhagen criteria as 
the ‘Ankara criteria’.
11 
The ‘what kind of Turkey?’ question may be distilled into two main alternatives. Will Turkey more 
resemble the early republic founded on principles of centralisation, secularism and homogeneity, 
which on several occasions were pursued through repressive and assimilationist means? Or will the 
Turkish nation-state truly fulfil its original objectives and develop into a civic nation, albeit one in 
which religious, regional, linguistic, cultural and ethnic diversity is fostered and respected? It appears 
reasonable to assume that while the future Turkish nation-state will differ significantly from the one 
known in the past, important features of the ancien regime will remain. Indeed over the last two years, 
Turkey’s transformation cannot be considered fanciful speculation. It represents a concrete reality. The 
constitutional reforms and ensuing harmonisation packages since October 2001 constitute indisputable 
evidence of change in Turkey. An increasingly credible EU anchor has certainly aided if not catalysed 
the endogenous modernisation of the Turkish nation-state. Nevertheless, this has not and is unlikely to 
entail a revolutionary change, which would give rise to an entirely different state and nation.  
EU membership would effectively imply abandoning the traditional interpretation of Kemalism and 
embracing a 21
st century re-conceptualisation of the Kemalist vision 80 years after the foundation of 
the state.
12 This change is in the making. Yet the precise extent of the transformation remains unclear. 
Much will depend upon internal political, social and economic dynamics in Turkey as well as the 
consistency, credibility and coherence of EU conditionality throughout the process of accession.  
                                                                 
10 Indeed for the AKP – emerging from the succession of banned Islamic parties – greater political freedoms are 
viewed as critical to their very survival as a political party.  
11 See, for example, the keynote speech by Minister of the Economy Ali Babacan at an informal EU-Turkey 
brainstorming meeting organised by the European University Institute and Sabanci University, Florence, 6-7 
May 2004.  
12 See Nathalie Tocci (2001), 21
st Century Kemalism: Redefining Turkey-EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era, 
CEPS Working Document No. 170, CEPS, Brussels. 8 | EMERSON & TOCCI 
 
3.  The impact of Turkey on EU foreign policy 
Assuming that the EU which Turkey joins is more likely to resemble a new medieval empire than a 
grand homogenous federation, and that the Turkey joining the Union at that time will be a 
transformation of (rather than a radical departure from) the 20
th century republican project, what are 
the implications for EU foreign policy? Turkey’s accession presents a set of challenges and 
opportunities. The extent to which the challenges posed can be transformed into opportunities hinges 
both on the development of Turkey’s accession process and on the precise mode of Turkey’s 
integration into EU structures. In turn, the joint foreign policy initiatives undertaken in the pre-
accession period will affect the impact of Turkey’s membership on EU foreign policy.  
The most important challenge posed by Turkey’s accession, and indeed from enlargement in general, 
concerns the ability of the Union to control its external borders and to act beyond them. The more the 
Union develops into a classic federal structure and the less Turkey (and the other member states) 
transforms in a homogenising manner, the greater the challenge of Turkey’s accession. Yet if the EU 
does not develop as a homogenous federation, how will its complex institutional system of multi-level 
governance interact with the outside?  
The history of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) teaches us that when faced with a 
foreign policy problem requiring short-term action, a traditional state actor is often infinitely more 
effective at mobilising its resources, given the greater simplicity in its policy-making process. If 
instead the Union is to develop into a system with multiple centres of authority, then not only will it be 
faced with the challenge of coordinating member-state positions, but also (a number of) these member 
states will need to coordinate with their respective sub-national levels of government. As put by David 
Allen, “if Bonn is to be challenged by the Länder, or Madrid by Catalonia, or Rome by northern Italy, 
or indeed London by Scotland, then the task of foreign policy coordination will become that much 
more complex”.
13 Within an enlarged Union that also includes Turkey, the nature of this problem 
would be magnified further. The Union would therefore need to devise a workable system whereby its 
huge political, economic, social, cultural and institutional diversity would no longer be a hindrance to 
effective decision-making vis-à-vis the outside.  
In terms of opportunities, Turkey’s membership offers a structural potential to enhance the credibility 
of EU policies towards the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Mediterranean regions. 
Turkey’s accession could contribute to a rebalancing of the Union’s focus towards its southern and 
south-eastern neighbourhood. The EU’s borders would reach Syria, Iraq and Iran as well as the South 
Caucasus. This could increase member-state incentives to engage with the south-eastern periphery. 
Furthermore, Turkey’s accession would entail that the EU’s Mediterranean population would represent 
40% of the enlarged EU. Qualified majority voting would per se increase the likelihood of greater EU 
attention to the south. The extent to which this would occur would depend critically on the evolution 
of Turkey’s own policies and positions towards these regions.  
Second, Turkey’s accession would affect the credibility of the EU as a foreign policy actor. Turkey’s 
membership, like the current eastern enlargement, would constitute a key EU foreign policy action. 
The extent to which such an action is successful depends on the degree to which the accession process 
will have contributed to a transformation of Turkey as a candidate. Rather than whether and when, it is 
the precise way in which Turkey enters the Union that will most critically determine its impact on the 
EU as a credible foreign policy actor.  
If consistent, sustained and principled EU policies contribute to and support a fundamental 
transformation of the Turkish state and society, the Union’s credibility as a civilian actor would rise. 
Such a success would have important demonstration effects on other candidate or would-be candidate 
countries. Moreover, Turkey’s accession process and in particular Turkey’s parallel process of 
political and economic transformation would offer EU actors further insights in the development of 
                                                                 
13 See David Allen (1996), “Conclusions: The European rescue of national foreign policy?” in Christopher Hill 
(ed.), The Actor’s in Europe’s Foreign Policy, New York: Routledge, pp. 288-304. TURKEY AS A BRIDGEHEAD AND SPEARHEAD | 9 
 
conditionality policies. The Turkish-EU experience would allow the enlarged Union to refine its 
techniques of conditionality, thus contributing to the quest of strengthening the EU as a civilian actor 
beyond its borders.  
A danger would arise if, on the other hand, the Union were to accept Turkey as a full member on laxer 
conditions than those specified by the accession process. Indeed, in the past, conservative elements 
within the Turkish establishment (often spurred by the US) have argued that Turkey should be 
admitted to the Union on different conditions given its geo-strategic importance. As a contrasting 
mirror image of the positive demonstration effect discussed above, Turkey’s accession in violation of 
EU conditions would set a dangerous precedent. This appears particularly relevant with regard to the 
EU’s involvement in the Middle East. Were Turkey’s own accession to be accomplished in violation 
of predetermined conditions, a bad example could be set for other potential candidates or close 
associates in the European Neighbourhood.  
Turkey’s accession would leave unanswered the question of what carrots the Union could offer to its 
neighbours beyond enlargement. In the aftermath of the eastern expansion, it has become increasingly 
clear that despite the success of enlargement, the Union cannot indefinitely rely on this instrument as a 
means to positively induce transformation outside its borders. Beyond Turkey and the Western Balkan 
countries, the Union is faced with the key challenge of finding an effective way of relating to the 
remaining post-Soviet states (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia 
itself) as well as with the entire southern Mediterranean basin and the Middle East.  
Hence, the first tentative steps towards the development of the European Neighbourhood policy, 
which is directed at the EU’s new neighbours that are not foreseen to become future members. The 
thinking within EU institutions is to offer additional benefits in order to add credibility to EU 
economic and political conditionality. The carrots offered would need to be sufficiently valuable to 
generate the potential for real change in the relevant regions. The conditional benefits on offer are 
expected to include participation in the EU single market without institutional representation and 
decision-making power. In the delivery of these alternative benefits, the Union is developing processes 
of negotiation, agreement and ratification through which the EU could exercise influence. It remains 
an open question whether the future packages will be sufficiently valuable and credible to induce 
reform within non-member states, given that such reforms are often viewed as difficult if not 
threatening to particular domestic elites.  
Turkey’s arguments for it to be viewed as a foreign and security policy asset to the EU have been set 
out in the speeches of Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan in January 2004.
14 The argument has several 
strands. In Box A we attempt to systematise them, adding some elements to those raised by Mr 
Erdoğan. 
Box A. Turkey’s possible assets for EU foreign and security policy 
Objective factors 
o  Turkey’s accession would lead to an extended reach of the European Neighbourhood policy. Turkey’s 
neighbours would become direct neighbours of the EU.  
o  Turkey has the role of a geographical hub for regional cooperation.  
o  Turkey is a secure energy-transport hub for Caspian, Middle Eastern and Russian oil and gas.  
o  Turkey is well situated to become a forward base for the EU’s security and defence policy, for military 
logistics and the credibility of the EU’s presence in the region.  
o  Turkey has valuable human resources to complement those of the EU for cooperation programmes, ranging 
from business know-how to language skills. 
                                                                 
14 These include Prime Minister Erdoğan’s speeches on 26 January 2004 to the Council for Foreign Relations in 
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Normative arguments 
o  Rather than representing values specific to particular cultures or religions, the Turkish case shows that 
democracy, secularism and human rights are universal values. 
o  Turkey’s EU accession would demonstrate that Europe is an inclusive concept, with multi-cultural values 
and openness to different religions.  
o  Turkey’s transformation of its security and foreign policy culture reveals less reliance on military power and 
greater emphasis on diplomacy and civilian instruments. 
o  Turkey’s accession would confirm the contribution of European integration to conflict resolution, with the 
reconciliation between the Turkish state and its Kurdish population, its rapprochement with Greece and its 
constructive role over Cyprus.  
Synergy 
o  Combining this list of points could give a synergetic boost to the EU’s capabilities and credibility as a 
foreign policy actor across the EU’s southern and eastern neighbourhoods.  
These several arguments are set out explicitly, as criteria and references for the review of the main 
‘theatres of operation’ for EU foreign policy that now follows. 
Eleven major theatres of operation may be identified as representing the core of the common foreign 
and security concerns of both the EU and Turkey. These consist of the set of Turkey’s neighbours, 
which may be taken as sub-regional groups or major states. These regions also concern the two major 
powers that also have their own interests in these regions – Russia and the US.  
The idea is to review these theatres of operation and to consider whether and how EU and Turkish 
interests and policies may be respectively convergent and complementary or otherwise. In the cases 
reviewed below, first the interests and foreign policy objectives of Turkey and EU actors are assessed 
to determine their degree of convergence or similarity. If interests and objectives are convergent, an 
attempt is made to assess whether and how the existing and future Turkish and EU foreign policies 
could become complementary and mutually reinforcing. In other words, do Turkey and the EU have 
complementary comparative advantages that would raise the prospects of jointly and more effectively 
tackling their shared objectives? If convergence and complementarity exist, how could such synergies 
be materialised in practice, thus enhancing the capabilities and credibility of the EU as a foreign policy 
actor? In some cases, Turkey has special interests or legacies from past history that will call for special 
efforts to bring them into harmony with the EU’s initial inclinations, positions and policies. In such 
cases, could Turkey and the Union tackle these special cases, transforming challenges into additional 
assets? A preliminary overview is offered in Box B. 
Box B. Potential convergence, complementarity or otherwise of EU and Turkish foreign policies in major 
theatres of operation 
The Balkans  Convergent and complementary 
The Black Sea  Convergent and complementary 
South Caucasus  Potentially complementary but not yet convergent; special factors – Armenia 
and Azerbaijan 
Central Asia  Convergent and complementary 
Russia  Convergent but risks of unintended effects 
Mediterranean  Convergent and complementary 
The Middle East  Increasingly convergent and complementary 
Iraq  Potentially convergent and complementary but has special sensitivities – Kurds 
and Turkomans 
Iran  Convergent and potentially complementary; special sensitivities – Kurds and 
religion 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf  Convergent and potentially complementary; special sensitivity – religion 
The United States  Turkey is increasingly convergent with EU positions TURKEY AS A BRIDGEHEAD AND SPEARHEAD | 11 
 
4. Geographical  dimensions 
4.1 The  Balkans 
With Bulgarian and Romanian accession expected in 2007, and Croatia also expected to join the 
accession negotiation process, EU interests and policies in the Western Balkans are clearly directed 
towards consolidating the transformation of the remainder of the former Yugoslavia, Albania and 
Moldova. Turkey for its part also has a vital interest in this transit region – which separates it from 
Western Europe – being politically stable and endowed with efficient transport infrastructures. The 
interests of the EU and Turkey thus seem essentially convergent, with the legacy of Turkey’s historical 
role in the region under the Ottoman Empire seeming to leave no outstanding problems to speak of.  
EU policy will be confronted by an increasingly pressing dilemma: how to include the whole of the 
region efficiently in its economic and security space, but without premature accession as full members. 
The dilemma is posed because the borders between member and non-member states in the region will 
be virtually impossible to control physically at the frontiers. In recent years, since the Kosovo war, the 
new borders of the Western Balkans have become a new source of illegal and criminal activities with 
the trafficking of goods and people. The tensions created by the new borders will be exacerbated with 
Bulgarian and Croatian accession, as under the present EU policy their borders with Bosnia and 
Macedonia, for example, will have to become Schengen-compliant in relation to visa requirements and 
other qualitative aspects of border management.  
This means that several policy domains will warrant the attention of the EU-25 (or EU-27 or -28 with 
Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia) in the years before the full accession of either Turkey or the 
remaining non-EU Western Balkan states. All of these policy issues are of direct importance to 
Turkey. 
First, there could be an expansion of the EU-Turkey customs union to include the whole of the rest of 
the Balkans. Turkey’s experience in joining the EU customs union without membership should here be 
a valuable experience.
15 At present the attempt to administer borders between Serbia, Montenegro, 
Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania is doing little more than creating new networks of illegal 
cross-border activity. The land borders between these small states and entities are unenforceable.  
Second, the emphasis will have to shift increasingly towards internal policing and deepening 
cooperation across the whole justice and home affairs (JHA) domains. Given the importance of flows 
of people as well as of goods from Turkey into the Balkans and on into Western Europe the task of 
JHA cooperation in southeast Europe between Turkey and the enlarged EU will be fundamental.  
Third, completion of the customs union should be flanked by investment in the major economic 
infrastructures. Parts of the pan-European transport corridors (especially number ten) that are of vital 
importance to Turkey are not yet adequate. The road connections from Istanbul to Belgrade are still 
lacking in highway quality in Bulgaria from Plovdiv to the Turkish frontier, and in Serbia from Nis to 
the Bulgarian frontier. In addition, the new bridge across the Danube at Vidin-Calafat, which was long 
delayed, should begin construction by the end of 2004, which should provide an alternative arterial 
highway for joining Turkey to Europe.  
Turkey is also well positioned to serve as a central transit route for rising European energy needs. The 
Greek-Turkish Interconnector gas pipeline project demonstrates Turkey’s contribution to energy 
security. The project is expected to further connect gas pipelines to Italy and from there to the rest of 
Western Europe. Turkey has also engaged in the Nabucco natural gas pipeline project, which would 
extend from Turkey and Greece to Bulgaria and all the way to Austria. The Commission has recently 
agreed to support feasibility studies for both projects. A final planned route for the transport of natural 
gas is the Western Balkans project, which would instead connect Turkey to Austria by passing through 
Greece, Macedonia, Serbia-Montenegro, Croatia and Slovenia. 
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Meanwhile, Turkey has been participating in combat and peacekeeping operations in the Balkans since 
the collapse of Yugoslavia. Turkey provided 1,450 military personnel from August 1994 to December 
1995 for the United Nations peacekeeping force of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This 
contribution was followed with a brigade unit in the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR), and 
subsequently in the current SFOR operation, with a force reduction down to battalion size unit only 
recently. In addition, Turkish naval vessels and aircraft have taken part in SFOR operations.  
During the Kosovo war in 1999, Turkey participated in NATO air operations with ten F-16 aircraft, 
flying over 2,000 hours of missions. Upon the establishment of the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR), 
Turkey contributed a mechanised infantry battalion, operating within the German-Italian brigade 
sector. Turkey took part in the naval operations in the Adriatic Sea with one frigate and one 
minesweeper, and contributed to the first EU military operation in the Republic of Macedonia in 2003. 
In the context of civilian police operations in the Balkans, Turkey still continues to participate in the 
EU police missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Macedonia. 
Turkey is a highly active contributor to regional military initiatives, seeking to create and build up 
regional security structures. The South-East European Brigade (SEEBRIG) was formed by seven 
states of the region (Turkey, Macedonia, Romania, Greece, Bulgaria, Italy and Albania as active 
participants, with the US and Slovenia as observers). This initiative aims at supporting regional 
security and good neighbourly relations in the context of the South-Eastern Defence Ministerial 
(SEDM) process, which is primarily NATO-oriented. In August 1999, the SEEBRIG headquarters 
were activated for the first time under a Turkish commander. The location of the Brigade headquarters 
is subject to rotation among Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Greece, and is now in Romania. 
4.2  The Black Sea dimension 
With Bulgarian and Romanian accession to the EU on the horizon, the additional prospect of Turkish 
accession would mean that the entire western and southern coastlines of the Black Sea would become 
EU territory. This would warrant a renewed interest in the need and potential for Black Sea regional 
cooperation. In early 1990s, Turkey was largely responsible for initiating what has become the Black 
Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) organisation, whose headquarters are in Istanbul. The BSEC 
institutional structure is comprehensive, with a parliamentary assembly, a development bank, a 
business council and a policy research institute as well as an executive secretariat to the Council of 
Ministers.  
There has been one, regional military cooperation initiative with the Black Sea Naval Cooperation 
Task Group (Blackseafor), established by Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine, 
with the founding agreement signed in Istanbul in April 2001. Blackseafor is an ‘on-call’ force, which 
can be tasked with missions related to search and rescue, humanitarian aid, de-mining measures, 
environmental protection, confidence-building visits and training operations. Blackseafor can also be 
made available for possible employment in UN- or OSCE-mandated peace support operations. 
Yet so far the BSEC has not been able to fulfil expectations. Several areas of cooperation for which 
the Black Sea region is the natural setting have been more effectively addressed in ad hoc 
arrangements outside BSEC, such as for the environment, transport and fisheries.
16 The EU has so far 
declined invitations to become institutionally involved and BSEC has insufficient resources to build 
up its role. There are also questions about whether Russia is politically willing to commit itself to 
significant multilateral actions at this regional level. In this situation the prospect of EU enlargement 
embracing half the Black Sea coastline may be the catalyst for change. The obligations of Bulgaria, 
Romania and Turkey to comply with EU policies in the region could provide a much stronger 
foundation for regional cooperation on several fronts, such as the environment, transport, energy links, 
fisheries and combating organised crime and illegal migration.  
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Turkey and the EU together could follow the model of Finland’s initiative in creating a ‘Northern 
dimension’ to EU policy. Finland’s own interest in good regional relations with Russia are evident 
enough for economic, political and security reasons. The key idea in this initiative, however, was to 
blend Finnish and EU interests and political ownership of the process. While Russia was initially cool 
towards the Northern dimension concept, it eventually cooperated and came to see its potential value. 
A new initiative for an EU Black Sea dimension could explore two avenues. A first one would be to 
examine the possibility of giving a new lease of life to BSEC, with the injection of human and 
financial resources from the EU for specific sectors of cooperation, taking into account how adoption 
of the EU acquis by Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey would in any case be ‘spilling over’ into the Black 
Sea region (e.g. for environment, transport, fisheries and border control). Moldova and Ukraine could 
also be disposed towards moving in the direction of EU-acquis conformity, given their interest in the 
EU’s Neighbourhood policy and their long-term EU aspirations.  
A second avenue would be to explore the possibility of making BSEC a forum for ‘political dialogue’ 
(meaning an open agenda for discussing political and security issues) between Black Sea states and the 
EU. While the case for this may not appear obvious at first sight, there is a special argument to 
consider. So far it has proved difficult to find a forum for political dialogue between the European CIS 
states and the EU, except in the very crowded meeting rooms of the OSCE or Council of Europe. If 
the EU associated with or acceded to BSEC, the forum could be convenient for discussing issues 
going beyond those narrowly linked to the geography of the Black Sea basin. The forum would have 
the quality of not being dominated by either Russia or the EU, nor rendered unwieldy because of too 
many seats around the table.  
An alternative third avenue may be for the EU to form an EU-Black Sea core group, based on the 
Black Sea states that were either EU member states or candidates. To these could be added those 
BSEC member states that become actively engaged in the European Neighbourhood policy.  
4.3 South  Caucasus 
To date the EU has refrained from playing a substantial role in the South Caucasus. The region was 
excluded from the initial plans for the Wider Europe/Neighbourhood policy proposed by the European 
Commission in 2003. This exclusion, however, was immediately controversial within the EU and was 
reversed in the more developed European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper adopted in May 
2004. Nonetheless, we are unlikely to witness a decisive EU involvement in the region in the near 
future.  
Of the three major neighbours of the south Caucasus – Turkey, Russia and Iran – only Turkey has 
frontiers with all three South Caucasus states (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia). Turkey particularly 
enjoys strong economic, political and military links with Azerbaijan as well as with Georgia. Since 
1990, Turkey signed a number of agreements with Azerbaijan and more recently with Georgia 
including those covering cultural and scientific exchange, economics and commerce, transport and 
communications, training and military cooperation. Turkey also plays an important role in the 
development of Caspian energy, notably with the Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline currently under 
construction and the planned gas pipeline to run alongside it to Erzerum. Finally, Turkey hosts 
important diaspora communities from the regions, including approximately 450,000 Abkhazian and 
two million Georgian Turkish citizens.  
EU and Turkish policies towards the Caucasus could be complementary, although to date their 
interests have not been entirely convergent. Turkey’s independent role in the region has been limited 
by the particularity of its relations with both Azerbaijan, with whom it has very close ethno-cultural 
ties, and Armenia, with whom relations have not yet been normalised owing to historical legacies. 
This partiality in loyalties has been reinforced by the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, which led Turkey 
to close its frontier with Armenia in 1992 and to come to the brink of war in 1993. In 1991 Turkey had 
been among the first states to recognise the independence of Armenia (as well as Georgia and 
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Western assistance to the region. Relations soured, however, in the light of the lack of recognition of 
Turkey’s eastern borders and territorial integrity accorded by the Armenian constitution, the activities 
of the Armenian government and the Armenian Diaspora to seek international recognition of the 1915 
genocide, and the eruption and evolution of the war in Karabakh. Turkey closed its eastern border for 
trade with Armenia and diplomatic relations were not established.  
Turkey’s potential economic and political roles in the Caucasus and the EU’s half-hearted recognition 
of the region’s importance but partial inability and unwillingness to take a more active and direct lead 
could neatly dovetail each other. The ‘rose revolution’ in Georgia at the end of 2003 triggered 
renewed EU interest in the region. The new government in Georgia has already proposed changing the 
equation in the trade regime between Turkey, Georgia and Armenia. In recent years the closed frontier 
(for trade) between Armenia and Turkey has led to a highly inefficient and corrupted trade route 
through Georgia. Railway tariffs have been extortionate, as have been taxes and bribes for road traffic. 
Anecdotal evidence collected by the World Bank reports that 80% of the cost of transporting goods 
from Yerevan to Moscow is incurred in crossing Georgia, and no doubt similar costs are incurred in 
traffic passing through Georgia to Turkey.
17 The new Georgian government has pledged to deal with 
these anomalies. This will increase the case for normalising Turkish-Armenian relations, since the 
closed border for trade has arguably damaged Turkish as well as Armenian interests. It has hindered 
regional economic development in the north-eastern Turkish border region and has failed to stop 
Armenian trade through Georgia and Iran. As such, it can no longer be considered as a powerful form 
of leverage on Armenia. 
This links not just to the unresolved conflict in Nagorno Karabakh, but also to the broader issue of 
Armenian-Turkish relations. The EU in general considers conflict resolution and good neighbourly 
relations as one of its security objectives. It calls for all accession candidates to resolve outstanding 
difficulties with their neighbours before acceding to the EU. Nevertheless, in situations in which good 
neighbourly relations affect some countries that are in the accession process and other countries that 
are outside it, the EU is faced with a dilemma and the potential for imbalance. In the case of Turkish-
Armenian relations, Turkey is in the accession process while Armenia remains outside it. Yet good 
neighbourly relations require concessions and goodwill on both sides. The elements of a 
comprehensive deal would entail Armenia’s recognition of Turkey’s borders and territorial integrity, 
and Turkey’s normalisation of economic and diplomatic relations with Armenia, along with a joint 
endeavour to address the burden of history. But given that as yet the EU does not have sufficiently 
dense contractual relations with Armenia to exert meaningful influence there, EU conditionality could 
only be applicable to Turkey. This situation could change if the EU were at a future point to begin to 
negotiate a Neighbourhood agreement with Armenia, with valuable benefits to Armenia conditioned 
inter alia upon progress in relations with Turkey.  
There could be a staged process of Turkish-Armenian reconciliation. Indeed, bilateral contacts 
between the two ministries of foreign affairs have been re-established recently and a step-by-step 
process has been accepted in principle by both. Currently officials are working on a roadmap for an 
approach that would consist of a set of simultaneous and sequential confidence-building measures. 
Some of these measures have already been implemented, such as the opening of direct air links 
between the two countries.  
More precisely, one could imagine a three-step roadmap. In the first phase, which could begin 
immediately (but more realistically in 2005 following the opening of accession negotiations with 
Turkey), Turkey could open its eastern border for trade with Armenia and allow its airspace for the 
transit of goods, including aid, to Armenia. In return, Armenia could amend its constitution, dropping 
the references to pre-1915 Armenia, given that this that implies ambiguity over its acceptance of 
Turkey’s territorial integrity. Armenia would then need to recognise Turkey’s eastern frontiers. The 
two countries could also establish a truth and reconciliation committee over the tragic events of 1915. 
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A group of eminent Turkish and Armenian (and if necessary third-party) historians would be 
commissioned to investigate the events of the past and report their findings after a given time period. 
In recent years there has been the beginning of a dialogue on these questions among small groups of 
eminent independent personalities on both sides. Through its bilateral relations, the EU could induce 
both Turkey and Armenia to pursue these steps. In the case of Turkey this would occur in the context 
of the accession process. In the case of Armenia, the EU would make the deepening of its bilateral 
relations conditional on efforts in this direction.  
The second stage could also introduce progress in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. A step-by-step 
approach to the conflict has been extensively discussed in the context of negotiations mediated by the 
OSCE-sponsored Minsk Group. A first step would include Armenian withdrawal from the occupied 
territories surrounding Karabakh and their return to Azerbaijan, together with internationally 
guaranteed transport corridors between Karabakh and Armenia, as well as between Erzerum and 
Azerbaijan. At the same time, Turkey could establish normal diplomatic relations with Armenia. In 
view of the fact that in the past Armenia rejected such an interim step, the EU could also exert 
pressure in this direction, provided it will have seriously deepened its bilateral ties with the South 
Caucasus countries.  
In a final phase the status of Karabakh itself would be settled. In all likelihood the solution would 
resemble the proposals that have already been tabled in past negotiations and in particular at the Key 
West Summit in 2001. The two principal ideas on the table have been either to retain Karabakh 
nominally within Azerbaijan, but to allow it its effective quasi-independence or to provide for a land 
swap between Armenia and Azerbaijan, whereby Karabakh and the corridors (of a width to be 
determined) would become part of Armenia, while there would be internally guaranteed corridors 
between Azerbaijan and its exclave Nakhichevan.  
Turkey has attempted to contribute to progress in the Karabakh conflict by proposing and pursuing a 
trilateral forum with the participation of Azeri and Armenian foreign ministry officials. In the past, 
however, owing to its bilateral relations with the two countries, Turkey could not be an impartial 
mediating influence. In the context of a staged process of Turkish-Armenian reconciliation, however, 
this could change.  
Indeed, Turkish foreign policy has recently demonstrated that it can undergo significant change. In 
2004 it did so in the context of Cyprus, where through a Turkish initiative, negotiations resumed in 
February 2004 and were concluded with the submission of the UN plan finalised by the secretary 
general and separate referendums (accepted by the Turkish Cypriot community but rejected by the 
Greek Cypriot side). While the immediate explanation may have been Turkey’s interest to advance its 
own EU-accession course, more fundamentally it represented the transformation of Turkey’s 
conception of its own security interests. The former conception was based on the retention of a 
balance of forces and the protection of a co-ethnic community through military presence. These 
objectives were often pursued through unwavering bargaining positions and brinkmanship. Recently, 
Turkish foreign policy has shifted on these issues. It has accepted that communal security could be 
achieved through constitutionally entrenched rights and federal practice, agreed through multilateral 
decision-making and compromise.  
Such a shift may well filter through into Turkey’s approach towards Nagorno-Karabakh, where, as 
opposed to Cyprus, it only plays an indirect role. In the case of Karabakh, there may be a limit to the 
extent of influence that Turkey could have on the principal parties. Yet within these limits, Turkey 
could work together with the OSCE Minsk Group and the EU special representative to overcome the 
current deadlock. In particular, Turkey could encourage Azerbaijan to make a similar transformation 
of its conception of its national interests with regard to Karabakh. If Turkey were to proceed with a 
staged process of normalising its relations with Armenia, it could also contribute towards inducing 
Armenia to make the necessary moves and concessions.  
Could Turkey also play a role in helping the South Caucasus countries engage in domestic political 
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domestic change in this direction also lead to a transformation of the perceived security threats in the 
region and in turn generate the potential for the regional cooperation schemes that have long been 
advocated by domestic and international actors alike?  
Beginning with Azerbaijan, could Turkey’s own experience in democratisation and modernisation 
over half a century become an asset in its bilateral relations with Azerbaijan? Turkey is unlikely to 
exert strong pressure on Azerbaijan to engage in human rights and democratic reforms. Nevertheless, 
the issue of political reforms is already being raised in bilateral Turkish-Azeri official meetings. 
Linked to the process of Turkey’s accession negotiations, a joint Turkish-EU role could become more 
realistic and effective for two interrelated reasons. First, Turkey’s accession process stimulated a 
significant deepening of Turkey’s democratisation. Not only has it spurred important legislative 
changes in Turkey, but it may be slowly contributing to the more long-term and far-reaching process 
of transformation in the country’s norms and values, which is necessary for the effective 
implementation of legislative reforms. Second, Turkish foreign policy together with that of the EU 
could engage in the support of democratisation and modernisation in countries such as Azerbaijan, 
without being perceived to be engaging in patronising pan-Turkic nationalism.  
Meanwhile, Armenia’s increasing interest in European integration and globalisation could lead to a 
long overdue overhaul of Armenia’s very rough democracy. One of the lessons of peace efforts seems 
indeed to be that a comparable degree of democratisation of the conflict parties is a necessary 
condition for durable conflict resolution, as opposed to mere conflict settlement that may be imposed 
by external parties or unaccountable domestic elites.  
These possible tendencies also could be seen in the context of the change of regime in Georgia that has 
already occurred. Turkey, like the EU, will not want to intervene strongly in the secessionist conflicts 
in Georgia. First, Turkey increasingly values its relations with Russia and does not wish to act in an 
antagonising manner. Second, the presence of large Georgian as well as Abkhazian communities in 
Turkey limits Turkey’s space for manoeuvre. Nonetheless, the very presence of these communities 
could facilitate an important Turkish and EU role in the post-settlement reconstruction phase. The 
Abkhazian diaspora in Turkey is now bigger than the present population of Abkhazia itself. Supported 
by EU resources, one could imagine that the Turkish Abkhazian community could contribute to a 
wider programme of post-conflict reconstruction and development of Abkhazia. The overthrow of the 
Aslan Abashidze regime in Ajaria in May 2004 may help. This is a direct border region for Turkey. If 
political progress could be achieved in Abkhazia as well there would be new development 
opportunities for the eastern Black Sea region, including re-opened rail links and the proposed new oil 
pipeline from Novorossisk to Supsa, linking to the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Projects such as these could 
also help Russia to see the positive interest in cooperative projects in the South Caucasus region.  
Taken together this would mean a transformation of the prospects for the entire South Caucasus. These 
efforts would combine and interact with the increasing European prospects for the region, along with 
Turkey’s pre-accession status leading the way for an enhanced European Neighbourhood policy by the 
EU towards the region. The seemingly utopian vision of a stability pact for the Caucasus advocated by 
President Süleyman Demirel in 1999, which was too early for implementation, could become a reality 
a decade later. An interesting development in this context is the recent decision by the speakers of the 
three parliaments of the South Caucasus states to promote the ideas of the stability pact and to 
establish a parliamentary assembly of the region. 
4.4 Central  Asia 
Turkey has cultural, linguistic and religious affinities with the main nationalities of all the Central 
Asian states except Tajikistan. Historically these links gave rise to the ideology of Pan-Turkism. In its 
heyday in the late 19
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for some form of union among the peoples with alleged Turkic origins.
18 Pan-Turkism was largely 
conditioned by the development of nationalism in south-east Europe, the Turco-Russian wars of 1877-
78 and the growth and pressures of pan-Slavism (primarily in its Russification form). In the first half 
of the 20
th century these Pan-Turkic aspirations were curtailed by circumstances: Turkey’s war of 
independence, the emergence and consolidation of the republican project, the Russian-Turkish 
rapprochement under Kemal Atatürk and Vladimir Lenin and the creation of the Soviet Union. In 
Turkey, pan-Turkic ideas resurfaced and entered into the mainstream political discourse again through 
the rise of the National Action Party led by Alparslan Turkeş in 1965. Pan-Turkism was adopted as 
one of the party’s official tenets. Yet Pan-Turkism never became a popular ideology in Turkey.  
In 1992, immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey embarked on an ambitious foreign 
policy initiative in Central Asia, embedded in a revival of Pan-Turkism, albeit without an irredentist 
character.
19 The break-up of the Soviet Union renewed direct contacts between the Turkey and the 
Turkic groups in the Caucasus and Central Asia. These included Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus and 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan in Central Asia (the fifth Central Asian 
Republic, Tajikistan, is the only one in which the minority language, Uzbek, rather than the majority 
language Tajik, is close to Turkish). The concept was that of strengthening the independence of the 
newly established republics, along with inducing their political and economic reforms and their 
integration in the global economy. 
Turkey had clear a clear rationale to engage in relations with the Central Asian republics. First, the 
Turkish establishment, following the EU’s rejection of its application in 1987, felt the need to explore 
alternative alliances. The independence of the Central Asian Turkic republics was an obvious option. 
Second, Turkish foreign policy-makers feared that with the end of the cold war, Turkey’s strategic 
position at the south-eastern flank of NATO would be weakened. Although Turkey’s geo-strategic 
significance was vindicated anew with the 1991 Gulf war, a deepening of ties with Turkic Eurasia was 
also a means of enhancing Turkey’s appeal to the West. Third, Turkey’s growing need to import 
energy induced it to seek alternative supplies to Middle Eastern oil. This need was particularly felt in 
the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf war and the ensuing disruption of oil flows from Iraq.  
Almost at the outset it became clear that Turkey’s links to Central Asia would take a bilateral rather 
than a multi-lateral form. President Özal and Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel invited, and were 
invited by the Central Asian leaders. All referred rhetorically to pan-Turkism and the common bond 
between their peoples. When it came to concrete measures, however, little was achieved multilaterally 
in practice. Turkey failed to set up a joint forum consisting of itself and four Turkic republics of 
Central Asia. Despite cordial relations among the leaderships, the presidents of Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan in particular were deeply suspicious of Turkish attempts to establish a common market 
among the Turkic republics, having been cautioned by the Russians. Ties with Russia, including the 
large Russian presence in Central Asia, were cited as reasons against the establishment of a common 
Turkic economic space. Moreover, relations among the Central Asian republics and between 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in particular were often far from cooperative.  
Despite these set-backs Turkey became deeply involved in Central Asia in the early and mid-1990s. It 
immediately provided emergency assistance (food and medicine) to the republics. It also engaged in 
medium- and long-term projects and concluded a number of bilateral agreements with the Central 
Asian republics, covering economics and trade, business cooperation, public administration, media 
and education, communications and transport. In the economic realm, Turkish companies were 
strongly encouraged by the state to invest in Central Asia. In 1992, around 60 Turkish banks and 
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businesses invested in Central Asia and approximately 150 established trade links with the republics. 
In particular Turkey provided Eximbank credits to the republics. In the field of administration, Turkey 
assisted the republics in building state institutions, offering training in the civil service, the army and 
the health service, as well as training in agriculture and statistics. Turkey offered assistance in 
establishing communications and media in the republics. Turkey also provided Turkish-language 
television broadcasts to the four republics.  
In the cultural and education domain, Turkey found itself on the shakiest ground. Turkey established 
several education institutions in the republics including two major universities in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan. Yet assistance in these fields was often perceived in Central Asia as being patronising or 
as attempting to impose Turkish cultural domination. The republics were extremely sensitive on this 
point both because of their desire to assert their own cultural identity and to avoid alienating Russia, 
which in many respects remained far closer to them than distant Turkey. Indeed Turkey’s attempts to 
export Turkish as a lingua franca in the region was in many respects obsolete given the widespread use 
of the Russian language throughout Central Asia. Another important limit to the Turkish role was 
Turkey’s own economic instability and weakness. Turkey alone simply did not have the means 
required to assist state-building or political and socio-economic development in Central Asia.  
Further, in the early 1990s, the EU established contractual relations with all the Central Asian 
republics (Partnership and Cooperation Agreements), although these have on the whole been thin 
relationships. Technical assistance has been supplied under the TACIS programme, but this has not 
been an easy process, partly because of the scarcity in the EU of relevant experts with either Russian 
or Turkish language skills. Financial assistance to the Central Asian republics has also been extremely 
limited, particularly when compared with other closer regions such as the Mediterranean and the 
Balkans, not to mention the acceding Central and Eastern European countries.  
Turkey’s accession process and ultimate membership could offer the potential to strengthen both the 
EU and Turkish roles in Central Asia. More specifically, provided that Turkey’s engagement is not 
driven by pan-Turkic aspirations (as it no longer appears to be), EU and Turkish interests could be 
convergent and their potential actions could be complementary. This could lead to a warmer reception 
of Turkish efforts in Central Asia, given that fears of Turkish cultural domination would be put at rest. 
Turkey could also benefit from EU cooperation in engaging in business and trade projects with Central 
Asia, owing to the limited economic means at its disposal. In this respect it is interesting to note that in 
the early 1990s, Turkey was keen to involve Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s Germany in jointly promoting 
business and investment in Central Asia. Turkish investment, while substantial, was insufficient for 
Central Asian needs. Hence, the Turkish government’s (to a limited extent successful) efforts in 
persuading German businesses to share in these investments.  
The EU for its part could benefit from the bilateral ties between Turkey and the Central Asian 
republics. In particular the deficiencies of the technical assistance under the TACIS programme owing 
to the lack of necessary language skills among EU personnel could be rectified to some extent through 
Turkish participation. Moreover, this would necessitate a deep bonding of the Turkish cadre of experts 
with their EU counterparts, which will be a complex task for many years to come. Preparations should 
therefore begin without delay, a point to which we return in section 5. It should be noted, however, 
that already Turkey increasingly joins CFSP statements concerning the democracy and human rights 
record of the Central Asian republics.  
4.5 Russia   
The implications for Russia of Turkish accession to the EU will be very significant, but depending on 
how EU-Turkish-Russian relations are managed either negative or positive outcomes are conceivable.  
To take the negatives first, Russia could see a set of threats to its interests and security, as traditionally 
conceived, on no less than five accounts. First, it would mean harder competition for influence in the 
South Caucasus. Second, this competition would extend even further into Central Asia, with Euro-
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leadership in Black Sea regional cooperation. Fourth, there would be increased challenge to Russia’s 
domination of oil and gas supply routes to Western Europe, with linkages through Turkey to the 
Caspian region as well as Iran and the Gulf. Fifth (and last but not least), the tightening of visa 
regimes by Turkey in the interests of EU and Schengen compliance would restrict the access of 
Russians and citizens of all the other CIS states to the Turkish market for business and tourism.
20 All 
this, if mismanaged, could be considered by Russia as a formidable set of threats. This encirclement 
by the successors to the former West European and Ottoman Empires is what Russia has been fighting 
wars over for 400 years.  
On the other hand this could be material enough, if carefully prepared and presented, to bring Russia 
into a deeper mode of cooperation with the enlarging EU. The transformation of Turkey as a society 
and a foreign policy actor in line with EU norms is the essence of the accession process. A similar 
process is partially underway in Russia as the new private economy sees the need to move towards 
modern norms of corporate governance, and in terms of the outlook of the growing post-Soviet 
generation. Yet President Vladimir Putin’s administration is still heavily influenced by ‘sphere of 
interest’ ideas, especially with regard to the CIS states of both Europe and Central Asia, given 
Russia’s weak capacity to project power globally. These are regions that will be affected most by the 
EU’s enlargement to the Black Sea coastline. At some point realistic calculations should prevail, and 
the sight of the EU organising its foreign and security policies more credibly together with Turkey 
may tip the balance of thinking about foreign policy in Moscow.  
Oil and gas geo-economics will be one of the ways through which the EU-Turkish-Russian 
relationship plays out. Already Turkey has signed a natural gas deal with Russia and cooperation on 
natural gas between the two countries is set to increase with the completion of the Blue Stream 
pipeline under the Black Sea. 
The question of Turkey introducing visas for Russians will be a sensitive issue. Two timetables have 
to be matched in the most constructive way: the timing of Turkey’s moves into compliance with EU 
visa policies and the negotiations about to begin between the EU and Russia over a facilitated visa 
regime at least for certain categories of people. As argued below in more detail, the EU should not 
require Turkey to introduce a much more restrictive visa hastily, before it has worked out what 
elements of flexibility it may introduce in the foreseeable future.  
4.6 Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership and the Greater Middle East 
With the accession of Cyprus and Malta, along with Turkey entering the pre-accession process, three 
parties to the Barcelona process will be moving politically from the ‘southern’ to the ‘northern’ side of 
the table. This will add to the case for re-evaluation of the stagnant Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
(EMP). This reshaping of the Mediterranean political map could be helpful in bringing greater 
coherence to the south and north respectively.  
Turkey has been a correct yet hardly enthusiastic participant in the Barcelona process. While in 
principle supporting the concept of greater EU involvement in the Mediterranean region, Turkey has 
been increasingly sceptical of the precise form and content of the EMP. Turkey has been frustrated at 
the inability of the EMP to move forward particularly as a result of the persistence of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. This frustration was naturally exacerbated following the eruption of the second intifada. 
Turkey’s lukewarm support has also been related to the fact that it was put together with the ‘southern’ 
group, which was at odds with its political priority to advance its EU accession prospects. Particularly 
during the period in which the majority of EU actors voiced their preference for a ‘European strategy’ 
for Turkey instead of Turkey’s accession (1995-99), Turkey understandably showed little interest in 
the EMP as an attractive substitute to its full accession.  
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Several reasons, however, suggest that this could change and Turkey’s role could become an important 
asset to a reinvigorated EU policy towards the southern Mediterranean. Largely convergent interests 
could be translated into complementary joint policies.  
First, since 1999, Turkey’s accession prospects have been clarified. Particularly with the opening of 
the pre-accession stage, if it could be arranged for Turkey to move to the northern side of the 
Barcelona table, Turkey could become a more enthusiastic supporter of the EU’s Mediterranean 
policies. This would also be a natural step given that the European Neighbourhood policy (ENP) is 
now going to overlay the existing Barcelona process, with a fresh bilateralisation of relations between 
the EU and each Euro-Med partner in the drawing up of so-called ‘action plans’ of the ENP. As a 
result of its accession process, Turkey was excluded from the ENP. Nevertheless, in view of its assets 
and location, the EU could greatly benefit from Turkey’s participation in the initiative on the EU side 
of the table.  
Second, in view of the extension of the EU structural funds to the new CEE member states, persisting 
EU financial assistance to the Western Balkans and increasing assistance to Turkey in the pre-
accession period, there could be some squeeze on the total aid directed to the non-EU Mediterranean 
countries. The leverage on economic and political reform in the Arab states derived from EU policies 
of conditionality would rest less on aid. On the other hand, the EU would need to more concretely 
develop its ideas in the realm of trade and the single market as already suggested in the ENP. Turkey, 
being in a customs union with the EU, is in principle obliged to enter into a free trade relationship with 
any Euro-Med partner state that enters into free trade with the EU. So far this principle has not been 
activated, mainly because the Euro-Med states have been afraid of the extra competition from Turkey. 
Nevertheless, it has recently been agreed with Morocco that it should negotiate a free trade agreement 
with Turkey in accordance with the customs union logic.  
Third, Turkey is already playing a role in the attempt by the G8 summit in June 2004 to launch a new 
cooperative initiative for what was initially going to be called the ‘Greater Middle East’, until this 
name and implicit region evinced serious reservations, with the result that the ‘Broader Middle East 
and North Africa’ became the language of the summit’s final declaration. This US-led initiative has 
had a difficult and halting birth because of the reputational damage to US foreign policy in the region 
suffered under the present administration. Something is emerging nonetheless in the shape of the G8 
Plan of Support for Reform, with seven predominantly Muslim states having accepted the invitation to 
the G8 summit (Afghanistan, Algeria, Jordan, Bahrain, Iraq, Turkey and Yemen). The summit 
established a Forum for the Future, which will be a new multilateral forum for all the states of the 
region that agree to participate. Within this framework there will be a Democracy Assistance 
Dialogue, to be co-chaired by Italy, Turkey and Yemen. The dialogue should include government and 
civil society actors. Its objectives are to share experiences in democracy programmes in the region, in 
order to enhance them and initiate new ones, as well as to establish joint initiatives including twinning 
and capacity-building projects.  
Although Turkey has serious qualifications for a role in these democracy-promoting initiatives, it has 
unique potential in another vital dimension to the politics and economics of the Middle East, namely 
water. Turkey controls both the Tigris and Euphrates rivers flowing into Syria and Iraq, and in 
addition has large supplies of river water flowing into the north-east corner of the Mediterranean. 
Multiple projects have been under negotiation or study, ranging from a water pipeline to Cyprus, water 
supplies to Israel by tanker (see further below) and possibilities for negotiation over water from the 
Tigris and Euphrates. Supplies into Syria downstream from the Atatürk damn on the Tigris are already 
regulated by a bilateral agreement with Syria. If the planned damn on the Euphrates is constructed, it 
will open the prospect of a trilateral negotiation between Turkey, Syria and Iraq. As and when 
accession negotiations with the EU begin, the issue of cooperative regulation of regional river basins 
under the EU Water Directive will arise in these cases. It has long been recognised that water 
diplomacy could have an important contribution to make to the Middle East peace process, with the 
Palestinian territories currently being drained of much of their water resources by Israel. The delivery TURKEY AS A BRIDGEHEAD AND SPEARHEAD | 21 
 
of Turkish water to the region is not yet on the horizon and could only marginally ease this acute 
problem, but could nonetheless become a practical proposition at some point in the future.  
4.7  The Arab-Israeli conflict 
In the Middle East, the EU, despite representing the largest aid donor, critically sustaining the 
embryonic Palestinian state and enjoying strong contractual ties with most states in the region and 
Israel in particular, has historically played a secondary role in any Middle East peace process. The role 
of the Union has always been secondary to and supportive of the leadership role of the US. Many 
reasons have been cited to explain this.  
Some have argued that the Union’s relative sympathy for the Arab countries and the Palestinians in 
particular caused Israel’s resentment and subsequently the latter’s exclusion of a primary EU role. The 
respect of the principal parties in a conflict is certainly key to a successful mediating role. Yet it is 
doubtful that the perceived EU ‘bias’ was at the root of the problem. First, beyond the rhetoric, in the 
manner in which the Union has conducted relations with the parties, it is difficult to argue that the 
Union displayed a bias against Israel and in support of the Arab countries. Second, and perhaps most 
importantly, perceived bias does not necessarily entail a lack of credibility, as evidenced by the 
position of the US, from Henry Kissinger’s role in the Middle East in the 1970s onwards. Despite an 
appreciation of the bias, Arab states accepted American mediation, which contributed to the delivery 
of the Israeli-Egyptian peace deal.
21  
What appears to capture the EU inadequacy in the Middle East is not so much a question of bias, but a 
general inability to use its (primarily economic) instruments effectively in the political realm. Despite 
its aid and trade links to the principal parties, the EU is unwilling and to a lesser extent unable to link 
and condition its instruments to the behaviour of the parties in the context of the conflict. It is probably 
this failure that has most damaged EU ambitions to participate effectively and substantially in any 
peace process in the region. The reasons are manifold and relate to the specific historical, ideological, 
economic and political interests in the region, as well as the general idiosyncrasies that prevent the 
Union from acting as a single, cohesive and coherent foreign policy actor. 
Turkey’s accession process and final membership would not alter EU positions towards the Arab-
Israeli conflict. In fact, Turkish and EU views on the conflict have become increasingly convergent. A 
general consensus of views exists (with minor differences that also exist within the EU itself) 
regarding the contours of a desirable solution as well as the necessary means to achieve it. More 
specifically, like the EU, Turkey has refrained from officially linking its bilateral relations to the 
progress or otherwise of the peace process. That is not to say that Turkish-Israeli relations have not 
been affected by the second intifada. Not least because of the Turkish public’s strong awareness of the 
plight of the Palestinians, the government has recurrently criticised Israeli policies.  
Nevertheless, it is also fair to say that Israeli-Turkish relations have cooled down in recent years. In 
the past, Israel has been an important investor in the Turkish South-East Anatolian Project (GAP). 
Since 1996, the two countries have cooperated in the military sphere. Military cooperation took the 
form of joint military exercises and military modernisation projects. From Turkey’s perspective (and 
more specifically from the perspective of the Turkish General Staff, who provided the impetus for the 
alliance), the upgrading of the relationship in the mid-1990s had several motivations. The alliance was 
intended to exert pressure on Syria, which at the time hosted PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. The 
Turkish military also hoped to share intelligence with Israel regarding the PKK. Other motivations, 
such as the expectation of access to the Israeli defence industry, Israel’s training of the Turkish air 
force or the support of the American Jewish lobby in Washington, were also important considerations. 
But it should be recalled that the policy initiative was fundamentally linked to Turkey’s fight against 
                                                                 
21 See Saadia Touval and William Zartman (1989), “Mediation in International Conflict” in Kenneth Kressel, 
Dean G. Pruitt and Associates, Mediation Research, the Process and Effectiveness of Third-Party Intervention, 
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, pp. 115-37. 22 | EMERSON & TOCCI 
 
the PKK. As such, given the reduction of violence in Turkey’s south-east region and the 
rapprochement with Syria, the rationale for the Turkish-Israeli military alliance has diminished.
22  
Although the rationale for a military alliance has eroded, cooperative relations in most other domains 
have persisted. The continuing and deteriorating Arab-Israeli conflict alone is unlikely to significantly 
alter these dynamics. For example, in September 2003, Turkey signed an agreement with Israel 
providing for Turkish water exports to Israel. One could only imagine a more substantive deterioration 
of Turkish-Israeli relations if Israel were to act against Turkish interests. In this respect, the possible 
increase of explicit or covert Israeli support for an independent or quasi-independent Iraqi Kurdistan is 
a critical new dimension to look out for.
23  
Yet compared with the EU, there is a greater rationale to Turkey’s positions on the (lack of) linkage 
between its bilateral relations and the peace process. Unlike the EU acting collectively, Turkey does 
not have sufficient leverage on the parties to alter their stance towards the conflict. Turkish foreign 
policy has preferred to maintain bilateral ties with the parties and express support, criticism or concern 
for their actions in the context of bilateral political dialogue. Indeed Turkey is the only country in the 
region with an ambassador to Israel. This has meant that Turkey has been the only Middle Eastern 
country that is considered as an ally by Israel. Turkey is also the only country of the region, and one of 
the very few European countries, that participates in the observer mission in Hebron (the Temporary 
International Presence in Hebron or TIPH).  
At the same time and principally in the last few years, Turkey has also improved its relations with the 
Arab world in general and with Syria in particular. In the past, Turkish-Syrian relations have been 
marred by four interrelated issues: first, Syria’s support for the PKK, particularly its hosting of 
Abdullah Öcalan until 1998; second, Turkey’s water policies in the Tigris and the Euphrates, 
generating Syrian fears of disrupted downstream water flows; third, Syrian historical claims over the 
Turkish province of Hatay; and finally, Turkey’s increasingly close relations with Israel, particularly 
in the military sphere. Relations between the two countries reached the brink of war in 1998 over the 
Öcalan affair.  
Yet in the last few years, bilateral relations with Syria have improved significantly. Concerning 
Turkey’s water policy, Turkey has provided Syria with a water flow of 500m³ per second. This interim 
agreement reached in 1989 is meant to hold until the three riparian states of the Tigris and the 
Euphrates (Turkey, Syria and Iraq) reach an agreement on the sharing or division of the water 
resources. Turkey has proposed the sharing of the water resources through a regional basin approach, a 
position that has now been accepted by Syria.
24 The turning point in Turkish-Syrian relations, 
however, came with the 1998 Adana Agreement over the cooperation between the two states in the 
fight against the PKK and the departure of Abdullah Öcalan from Syria. Currently, the Kurdish issue 
is in fact pushing Turkey and Syria closer together, given both countries’ fear of the possible 
establishment of an independent Northern Iraq. Relations improved further following the participation 
of Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer in the funerals of the late Syrian President Hafez al-Asad. 
Since then, there have been over 50 bilateral visits between the two countries, including the visit by 
President Bashar al-Asad to Turkey. Notable in this respect was the fact that during Mr Bashar al-
Asad’s visit, no mention was made of Syrian claims over Hatay.  
In view of Turkey’s perceived neutrality, the policy assets that the EU and Turkey could bring to bear 
upon the Arab-Israeli conflict (or future peace process) could be largely complementary. Turkey’s role 
could contribute to the EU’s actor-capability in the region. Owing to both its vicinity and its political 
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position, Turkey would improve the Union’s image in the eyes of local actors and thus raise their 
willingness to accept an EU political role. It would also bring the Union to their doorstep, thus raising 
the latter’s scope for involvement. More specifically, Turkey could contribute to the EU’s role as an 
actor in the Middle East in two principal ways.  
First, Turkey already stands as an actor in the Middle East, with sound relations with all the 
conflicting parties. Although it does not have the necessary instruments to induce the end of violence 
and the resumption of negotiations, it can act as a facilitator provided the parties themselves summon 
the necessary political will. For example, during Mr Bashar al-Asad’s visit to Turkey, the Syrian 
president conveyed Syria’s views concerning a possible re-launch of the second Syrian-Lebanese track 
of the peace process to his Turkish counterpart. Mr al-Asad called upon Turkey to express these views 
to Israel. This event showed that although Turkey itself cannot induce a re-launch of the peace 
process, if and when this was to happen, it can play a useful mediating role. Provided the EU became 
more willing to use its policy instruments in the context of the Middle East conflict, Turkey’s role as 
an accepted mediator between the parties could further strengthen the EU’s assets as a political actor.  
The Greek-Turkish rapprochement in the EU context could also become a valuable EU diplomatic 
instrument to be deployed in the Middle Eastern context. The first steps in this direction were taken 
with the joint diplomatic mission to the Middle East by the then Foreign Ministers George Papandreou 
and Ismail Cem in early 2002. With the advancement of Turkey’s accession process and the deepening 
rapprochement with Greece, Turkey’s facilitating role in the Middle East conflict could be boosted by 
the participation of other EU actors such as Greece and possibly Cyprus at a later date (i.e. following a 
settlement of the conflict).  
Second, in view of its membership of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Turkey could 
also act as a bridge between the EU, as a member of the Quartet, and the OIC. For example in May 
2004, Turkey, together with Malaysia, Senegal, Palestine and Morocco representing the OIC met with 
the EU Irish presidency to discuss the institutionalisation of relations between the OIC and the 
Quartet. This sub-group of the OIC then met the Russian foreign minister and the UN secretary 
general. It is also shortly set to meet the US secretary of state to discuss the issue.  
4.8 Iraq 
In principle EU and Turkish interests in Iraq are convergent. Like the EU, and perhaps even more so 
owing to its location, Turkey’s general interests are in fostering a peaceful and democratic Iraq. This 
could include a decentralised or federalised Iraq, provided that the emerging governing system was 
both workable and representative. The end of violence and the creation of a democratic system are 
considered the best guarantee of Iraq’s stability and its ensuing territorial integrity. Stability and 
territorial integrity in turn are viewed as key to the stability of Turkey’s own bordering regions. Indeed 
since the 1980s, Turkey has paid a heavy price for war and instability in Iraq, in terms of large-scale 
refugee flows, the disruption of trade and oil flows and perhaps most critically the ability of PKK 
insurgents to use Northern Iraq as a base to attack Turkish armed forces.  
Nevertheless, in view of its vicinity, Turkey’s sensitivities regarding developments in Iraq go beyond 
the general concerns of most EU actors. First, in the light of persisting instability in Iraq, the main 
camps and headquarters of the armed factions of the PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL are still based in 
Northern Iraq. Minor yet regular skirmishes between these militants and Turkish forces continue, 
reminding Turkey’s citizens and the state alike of the small yet dreaded possibility of a resumption of 
large-scale violence in the region. Second, continuing instability in Iraq and the aggravation of 
violence that could escalate into an inter-ethnic or inter-confessional civil war (or both), could well 
result in a de facto or de jure secession of Northern Iraq. For a while Turkey has enjoyed cordial if not 
good relations with the two Iraqi Kurdish leaders: Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talebani. The secession 
of Northern Iraq would, however, undoubtedly generate serious concerns in Turkey, in view of the 
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There is the further Turkish concern for the place of the Turkoman (as well as the Arab) minority 
within the Kurdish region of Iraq. The non-Kurdish population in Northern Iraq are politically under-
represented at present and are likely to remain so in the event of its secession.  
Yet irrespective of these fears, the possibility of a Turkish invasion in Northern Iraq appears far-
fetched to say the least. Indeed, Turkey neither sent additional troops during the war nor did it send 
more troops thereafter.
25 On 7 October 2003, upon US demands, the Turkish parliament voted to allow 
the government to send troops to Iraq. But Iraqi Kurdish leaders strongly resisted the proposal and 
were in the end backed by the US occupation forces. Despite the authorisation by parliament, the 
Turkish government refrained from sending its troops. The government’s current position is that it 
would be willing to contribute politically and financially to Iraq’s stabilisation. It is also determined to 
ensure effective border management along the Iraqi frontier, regardless of the fact that there are no 
prospects of a Turkish military contribution to future peacekeeping let alone war efforts in Iraq.  
There are three principal reasons why a Turkish military role in Iraq would be highly improbable. First 
and most importantly there have been no signs to date that developments in Iraq have refuelled 
separatist or irredentist forces among Turkey’s Kurdish population. In other words, developments in 
Iraq have not given rise to a credible threat of irredentism. Second, it seems highly unlikely that 
Turkey, proceeding along an EU-accession track, would derail its efforts towards internal 
democratisation and EU accession by resorting to military means in Iraq. Third, Turkey’s own Kurdish 
population, given a realistic prospect of EU accession, would most likely prefer to be part of the EU 
than part of an independent Kurdistan with Northern Iraq. Naturally if the options for the Turkish 
Kurds had been to be part of a Kurdish state or of a repressive and backward Turkish state, Iraqi 
Kurdish independence could have refuelled secessionist trends in Turkey. Yet under a scenario of a 
reforming and increasingly democratic and prosperous Turkey on the doorsteps of EU membership, 
this is highly unlikely. Opinion polls in Turkey have shown that the highest support for EU accession 
in Turkey indeed comes from its citizens of Kurdish origin. Some 87% of Turkey’s Kurdish citizens 
support EU accession compared with an average of 78% of citizens who only speak Turkish. 
The most desirable scenario from both Turkish and EU standpoints would be that of a soundly 
functioning, federal Iraq, in which the oil revenues of the Kurdish region were distributed according to 
a federal agreement. Furthermore, if the US military occupation and political control were replaced by 
a UN-mandated political presence, possibly backed up with a NATO/UN military presence, Turkey 
has extremely important political and logistical assets that could become a major feature of the 
endeavour. In this scenario the EU also could establish a common position over Iraq and an EU-
Turkish operational and political partnership could be developed. Insofar as Turkey’s present role in 
Iraq is heavily determined and managed by the Turkish General Staff rather than by the government, 
however, Turkey-EU cooperation in Iraq would require coordination between EU actors and the 
Turkish military. If such a contact were established, then in a context in which the reputation of the US 
has deteriorated so seriously over the recent period of military occupation of Iraq, it is all the more 
plausible that in due course the EU with Turkey could come to play a role in supporting or dealing 
with whatever kind of Iraq emerges from the present conflict.  
4.9 Iran 
Historically, relations between Turkey and Iran have never been overtly confrontational. Yet since the 
1979 Iranian revolution, Turco-Iranian ties have been strained over the two aspects that have been 
viewed as most critical to Turkish national security: namely political Islam and Kurdish separatism. 
The Turkish state has been concerned about Iranian aims at exporting the Islamic revolution to Turkey 
– an anathema to the secular Turkish establishment. In the 1980s this took the form of Iranian support 
for small fundamentalist groups in Turkey as well as assassination attempts of Turks in Iran and 
Iranian liberals in Turkey. These real and perceived threats have diminished in the last decade. 
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Assassination attempts ended in the 1990s and the support for Islamic groups in Turkey has been 
steadily falling. Indeed, Iran itself has de facto abandoned its ambitions to export the revolution 
beyond its borders.  
Another interlinked source of concern has been Iran’s support for the separatist PKK. In the past Iran 
has allowed its territory to serve as a training base for the PKK. It was also in this context that the 
PKK began acquiring Islamic undertones in its rhetoric, in principle in sharp contrast to the ideology 
of a supposedly Marxist movement. Iran’s support for the PKK was linked to its aims of strengthening 
political Islam in secular Turkey. By supporting the PKK and thus weakening the Turkish state, Iran 
would be freer to support political Islam in Turkey. In view of Iran’s own Kurdish population, 
however, its support for the PKK was always constrained. Furthermore, following the election of 
President Mohammad Khatami’s government in 1997, support for the PKK diminished considerably 
and Turkish anxieties have been largely, albeit not entirely, abated.  
In the light of these diminishing threats, EU and Turkish interests and positions regarding Iran have 
been increasingly convergent. Like the EU, Turkey has an interest in a steadily reforming Iran, in 
Iran’s cooperation in the fight against international terrorism and in the monitoring of Iran’s nuclear 
programme. Its preferred means to pursue these interests have converged with those of the EU rather 
than of the US. Turkey has rejected political and economic sanctions against Iran and the identification 
of Iran as part of an ‘axis of evil’. Instead, Turkey has opted for a policy of engagement, using 
bilateral ties to discuss Iran’s relations with the West in general and with Europe in particular. As such 
Turkey has supported the EU’s attempts to engage in a critical dialogue with Iran on issues of mutual 
concern. In particular it has supported the EU’s political conditions linked to its proposals for a 
possible Trade and Cooperation Agreement with Iran, as well as the joint mission of the British, 
French and German foreign ministers exerting heavier pressure on Iran over nuclear proliferation. 
Yet beyond convergent interests, Turkish and EU policies could also be complementary. In recent 
years, Turkey and Iran have engaged in a dialogue on security issues and political ties between the two 
countries have been upgraded. There have also been growing economic relations between the two 
countries. Between 2002 and 2004 bilateral trade rose from $1.2 billion to $2.3 billion per year. 
Turkey currently represents the third largest investor in Iran. In addition, Turkish and Iranian civil 
society organisations and movements increasingly cooperate and undertake joint activities. These 
growing political, economic and social ties between Turkey and Iran could act as an asset to EU 
endeavours to engage in a dialogue with Iran. Furthermore, joint EU-Turkish initiatives towards Iran 
would be well-received by the latter, who’s motto in recent years has been that of promoting a 
‘dialogue of civilisations’.  
The Tabriz-Erzerum gas pipeline connection from Iran into Turkey is also of considerable interest to 
the EU, as this connects with the Turkish gas network, soon to be expanded and then linked with that 
of Greece and thence into the rest of the EU either via Bulgaria and the Balkans or via Italy. Iran’s 
own pipeline network connects with Turkmenistan, whose exports Russia has sought to monopolise. 
As such, Iranian gas exports to Europe are of much interest to the latter, which is keen to develop 
alternative energy sources to Russia. There are also possibilities for major European investments in 
Iranian offshore gas deposits in the Gulf, which would be shipped to market by LNG tankers. 
Finally, there is the notable point that Turkey maintains a visa-free regime with Iran, which means a 
lot for the Iranian population and for the West as a whole in terms of facilitating Iran’s contact with 
Europe. Currently, around 450,000 Iranians cross into Turkey per year for tourism, business and 
educational purposes. Many of those crossing into Turkey come from the Turkish-Iranian border 
regions. Yet in the pre-accession period, the EU has requested that Turkey moves into line with EU 
visa policies. Indeed Turkey has already harmonised its visa policy with that of the EU by 
approximately 75%. It is expected that by the end of 2004 the visa-free regime for Iran (as well as for 
Morocco, Tunisia and Kyrgyzstan) will be terminated. This will have a negative effect in relation to 
Turkish as well as EU foreign policy objectives to minimise the perceived ‘exclusion’ effect of the 
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4.10 The Gulf and the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
Both Turkey and the EU have an interest in gradual reform towards political participation, human 
rights and then democratisation in the Gulf region. They also have an interest in securing the 
cooperation of the Gulf countries in energy security and in the fight against terrorism. Nevertheless, 
both Turkey and the EU have enjoyed relatively thin relations with these countries. The EU has 
attempted in recent years to relate to the Gulf countries though multilateral forums, exploring the 
prospects for deepening and institutionalising relations between the EU and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC). Turkey instead principally relates to the Gulf through bilateral relations, as well as 
interacting with them in the context of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Particularly 
through bilateral commercial ties, Turkey’s relations with most Gulf states have been steadily 
expanding in recent years. Investors from the Gulf have also shown increasing interests in projects in 
Turkey. 
Taken at face value, a secular and democratising Turkey could offer important lessons to the initiation 
of a reform process in the Gulf countries. Indeed in the context of the emerging Broader Middle East 
and North Africa Initiative, Turkey has agreed to co-chair the Democracy Assistance Dialogue. Yet 
precisely in view of Turkey’s secular nature, there are serious limits to its ability (and willingness) to 
foster political change in the Gulf.  
Particularly in the case of Saudi Arabia, Turkey’s secular nature is viewed as an anathema to the ruling 
elites in Riyadh. Saudi Arabia and Turkey are on opposite ends of the spectrum as far as the role of 
religion in politics and society is concerned. The republican project initiated by President Atatürk, far 
from being viewed as a ‘model’ in Riyadh, is considered to be adverse to the vision and policies of 
many (albeit not all) members of the ruling elite in the Kingdom. In addition, the legacy of Ottoman 
rule has not been forgotten. Hence, a highly visible and pro-active Turkish role in promoting political 
reform in Saudi Arabia is certain to backfire and destabilise Turkey’s growing bilateral ties.  
Also related to Turkish state views about secularism and the West is Turkey’s role in the OIC. 
Turkey’s membership in the OIC has been and is increasingly an asset to Europe, when it comes to 
deepening and institutionalising its relations with the Muslim world. Because of the nature of the 
Turkish state, however, Turkey often finds itself ill at ease in the OIC. Turkey often feels and is 
perceived by other members as not belonging to the OIC, and in particular to any of its geographical 
groupings, i.e. Asia, Africa or the Arab world.
26 
When it comes to Turkey’s relations with the smaller Gulf states, Turkey’s experience in political and 
economic reform, within limits, could act as a useful precedent. To date, countries such as the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) have shown little interest in proceeding along the path of political liberalisation. 
The UAE appears content to develop as the key tourism and high-tech hub of the Gulf region. Other 
states, most notably Qatar and Bahrain, and in different respects Yemen, are showing promising steps 
towards greater political participation and liberalisation. Again, the extent to which the Turkish 
example could translate into operational initiatives is highly limited. These smaller Gulf countries are 
determined to proceed along the delicate path of political reform at their own pace through home-
grown initiatives.  
A final and promising avenue of Turkey’s role in the Gulf is the Neighbouring Countries Initiative. 
This initiative was born in 2003, stemming from the common interest of all of Iraq’s neighbours to 
prevent the war. It includes all of Iraq’s neighbours, with the exception of Kuwait (which supported 
the US invasion and occupation), as well as Egypt. The countries of the initiative have met five times 
both before and after the American attack. So far the initiative remains ad hoc and the only item on the 
agenda has been Iraq. It is conceivable, however, that the initiative will persist and institutionalise. If 
so, it could become of considerable interest to the EU, which is still in the process of developing a 
concerted strategy towards the war-torn country.  
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4.11 The United States 
Turkey and the US have been allies for over 50 years, both in the context of NATO and through their 
bilateral relations. The EU, Turkey and the US have shared similar strategic interests. This has 
remained so both during the cold war and thereafter. In other words, together with all European 
countries and the US, the Turkish Republic has always firmly placed itself within the ‘West’.  
That is not to say that Turkey’s (or indeed the EU’s) relations with the US have been static. 
Particularly during the run-up to and start of the Iraqi war, relations between both Turkey (and several 
EU member states) and the US have been strained. On 1 March 2003 a resolution was brought to the 
Turkish parliament by the ruling AKP government to allow the temporary deployment of 62,000 US 
troops on Turkish soil. The deployment and transit through Turkey would have allowed a second-front 
attack against Iraq. By a few votes, the motion failed to pass through parliament and the American 
troops were re-routed to Kuwait. At the time, the rejection of the motion appeared to have plunged 
US-Turkey relations to their lowest ebb since the 1974 arms embargo following the partition of 
Cyprus.  
The rejection of the motion can be explained by several factors. On the substantive side, most within 
the Turkish establishment resisted an American attack without international legitimisation. 
Furthermore, as was the case throughout the Middle East and Europe, Turkish public opinion strongly 
opposed the war. In addition, Turkey had specific fears and concerns related to its location as a 
bordering country. As all other countries in the Neighbouring Countries Initiative and indeed as the 
rest of the Muslim world, Turkey feared the political and economic destabilisation of the region 
stemming from an illegal American attack. Turkey in particular remembered the high social and 
economic costs that had come with the 1991 Gulf war. More specifically, Turkey felt that the US 
administration had taken almost no notice of all of the warnings and advice that it (as well as other 
countries from the region) had provided.  
The result of the vote was also coincidental. Albeit after much time and hesitation, the government did 
propose the motion for approval by parliament, the majority of which was controlled by its own 
parliamentarians. In addition, the military establishment had not vocally expressed its opposition to the 
war. In turn, the motion was rejected by only three votes. Having failed to garner a majority by such a 
small number of votes, the rejection must be considered coincidental rather than strategic. The 
coincidental result naturally does not detract from the fact that there had been substantive reasons 
motivating the scepticism of most parliamentarians.  
In the aftermath of the rejection of the motion, tensions rose as the US administration strongly warned 
Turkey not to intervene in Northern Iraq independently of American command. In July 2003 matters 
worsened further when US troops arrested a Turkish military unit in Suleymaniye in Northern Iraq.  
Ensuing events, however, came to stabilise the relationship. In the context of the Iraqi crisis, the 
Turkish government strengthened its relations with the Arab world and Iran, without straining its 
relations with Israel or hinting at a reversal in its Western orientation. Turkey respected its pledge not 
to unilaterally send additional troops to Northern Iraq, which could trigger clashes with Iraqi Kurdish 
forces. On the contrary, it had offered to send Turkish troops to Iraq as part of the Anglo-American 
forces in October 2003. Nevertheless, when the US, persuaded by the strong Iraqi Kurdish resistance, 
decided that it was best not to involve Turkish troops, the government refrained from deploying them.  
The incident of the motion, while not leading to a permanent Turkish-American rift, may have led to a 
subtle re-evaluation of relations between the Turkish military and the Pentagon.
27 The push for the war 
in Iraq was predominantly driven by the US Department of Defense, which had traditionally 
emphasised Turkey’s strategic significance and enjoyed extremely close relations with the Turkish 
military. Indeed, the failure of the parliamentary motion in March 2003 may have given way to an 
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increased civilianisation of Turkish-American relations. A stronger lead by the US State Department 
may result in a greater focus on Turkish democratisation in relations between the two countries.  
Greater American focus on Turkey’s political and economic reform may prove far more fruitful to 
Turkey’s accession process than US pressure on EU member states. In the past the US attempted to 
exert pressure on EU member states to be more forthcoming towards Turkey. US pressure has indeed 
contributed to important EU decisions on Turkey, such as the 1996 customs union agreement and the 
1999 Helsinki European Council’s decision to extend EU candidacy to Turkey. But since then, and in 
particular at the December 2002 European Council in Copenhagen, heavy-handed US pressure in 
favour of Turkey might have backfired.  
There appear to be two key reasons for this. First, exerting pressure in the realm of foreign policy, for 
example by encouraging greater EU cooperation with Turkey, is categorically different from exerting 
pressure to accept Turkey as a member state. The decision to accept a new member state, particularly 
an important and complex one such as Turkey, is increasingly becoming an issue of domestic debate 
in EU politics, especially in member states such as France, Germany and the Netherlands. As such it is 
far less amenable to outside pressure than foreign policy questions, conditioned also by EU-US 
relations. Second, for countries such as France and Germany (among the most reticent vis-à-vis 
Turkey), the strong US support for Turkey’s accession is viewed increasingly as a form of 
inappropriate pressure, which in light of the widening transatlantic rift, has paradoxically hardened 
views on Turkey’s accession. Hence, greater American encouragement for Turkey to reform its 
domestic practice as well as its foreign policy conduct is far more likely to support Turkey’s EU 
accession. It would also prevent Turkey from being an additional (albeit occasional) item of European-
American divergence.  
The Turkish government is positioning itself to play a constructive role in the Middle East, in a 
manner that is convergent with both US and European declared interests. Prime Minister Erdoğan has 
engaged in a highly positive political debate in the US, as evidenced for example by his speeches in 
January 2004 in New York and at Harvard. The Turkish leadership is thus able to deploy arguments 
about favouring the progressive democratisation of the Middle Eastern region, ostensibly supported by 
American as well as European leaderships.  
In conclusion, following Turkey’s stance towards the war in Iraq, Turkish policy seems to be settling 
down into a maturing, rather than a disintegrating relationship with the US. It has also brought 
Turkey’s foreign policy closer to the underlying ideology of European foreign policy, even if the EU 
has itself been so deeply split over Iraq. The scene is therefore set for a credible deepening of Turkish-
EU collaboration over future developments in the Middle East.  
5. Instruments  of  Turkish  foreign and security policy 
In the 1990s Turkey took two seminal steps to give new direction to its foreign policy towards its 
eastern neighbours, and added a third traditional dimension. First, in opting to rapidly and strongly 
develop its relations with the Central Asian republics in the early 1990s, Turkey organised complex 
programmes of economic, cultural and governmental assistance on a much larger scale than hitherto 
seen. With the turn of the century, Turkey has also been developing its bilateral relations with Middle 
Eastern countries. Second, it accompanied this development cooperation activity with a radical policy 
of openness for the virtually visa-free movement of people between the neighbouring states and 
Turkey.
28 Third, Turkey has retained a very substantial military capacity relative to those of any of its 
neighbours. All these three elements now raise opportunities or at least policy issues in the context of 
integration with the EU.  
The potential opportunities and assets are manifold in the development cooperation and security 
domains. Turkey has human resource assets that are complementary to those of the EU, with the 
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cultural links and understandings of Eurasia and the Middle East that could in principle be deployed 
alongside the financial and technical resources of the EU. Turkey has both military and police forces 
that could make major contributions to the headline goals of the EU for its security and defence policy, 
and especially by way of resources that could be effectively deployed in south-east Europe and the 
wider Middle East.  
Nevertheless, there is going to be a difficult issue concerning the movement of persons. Although 
openness to neighbours is an important means for fostering modernisation and the harmony of peoples 
and civilisations, for European countries this has become difficult to reconcile with domestic security 
priorities in the era of global terrorism, in which the source and epicentre is in the Middle East.  
5.1  Instruments of cooperation
29 
When Turkey decided to mount its ambitious Central Asian policy initiative in 1992 it needed to 
create a new or strengthened administrative infrastructure dedicated to the purpose. The main steps 
here were seen through the creation of the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) for 
official assistance in 1992. Since 2000, TIKA has realised 380 projects in the Balkan, Black Sea, 
Caucasus and Central Asian states. In addition, the DEIK (Foreign Economic Relations Board), which 
represents 490 leading Turkish companies, has established bilateral business councils with all of 
Turkey’s neighbouring states. Thus the range and logic of these initiatives immediately spanned wider 
than Central Asia alone, as also seen in the creation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) 
in 1992, headquartered in Istanbul. 
Although the Central Asian initiative, as discussed earlier, proved over-ambitious and was later scaled 
back, it nonetheless saw some substantial action. By early 2003, 7,557 students from the Turkic 
republics had been enrolled in a variety of Turkish educational establishments, mostly universities, out 
of an initial target figure of 10,000 decided only the previous year. This alone is an impressive 
indicator of Turkey as civilian foreign policy actor. Turkey opened elite high schools in each of the 
Turkic republics, where the working languages are English as well as Turkish. In 1992, a Turkish-
Kazakh University was founded. Other cultural initiatives of importance include aid for the adoption 
of the Latin script in the Turkic republics and television broadcasting channels in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia.  
Religious education was also an important line of development. In 1992, 42 imams were sent by the 
Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs to the Turkic world and 602 students came to Turkey for 
religious education from 1991 to 1993 from Muslim communities in the former Yugoslavia, the North 
Caucasus and Tartarstan in Russia, Crimea in Ukraine as well as Central Asia. Theology faculties and 
colleges were opened and mosques built on a substantial scale. The objective of these initiatives was 
to move fast into the ideological and spiritual vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union with 
support for moderate Islam, as opposed to the radical drive coming especially from Iran. The influence 
of these initiatives in transmitting cultural values, according to Idris Bal, “may be even greater than 
that of official Turkish policy”.
30 
Trade and investment multiplied fast from a low base, resulting in Turkey becoming the second 
investor (after Russia) in Central Asia, with hundreds of Turkish firms establishing a much finer and 
more extensive micro-economic penetration than had come from the West.  
More recently, Turkey has hosted new training institutions or activities that relate to general Western 
priorities. For example in 2000 the Turkish International Academy against Drugs and Organized 
Crime (TADOC) was founded in Ankara, with 50% of its funding from Turkey and 50% from the UN 
Development Programme (UNDP). This organisation has trained 450 officials from 37 countries so far 
(particularly from the Balkan, Black Sea and Central Asian countries). TADOC provides courses in 
Turkish, English and Russian and it is equipped with all the necessary translation services. It also 
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fosters formal and informal networks of cooperation, primarily through the sharing of information.
31 
This link should also provide the basis for a partnership with the EU’s European Monitoring Centre 
for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) in Lisbon. In addition, the police and military academies 
are receiving considerable numbers of officer cadets from neighbouring regions, ranging from the 
Balkans to the Caucasus and Central Asia.  
The classic pre-accession period sees the EU supply large-scale assistance for the candidate state to 
comply with existing EU legislation and norms. The Turkish case presents itself with the additional 
aspect of a candidate state that has a huge interface with Eurasia and the Middle East, which harbours 
Europe’s most serious security interests and concerns. Turkey’s potential as a logistical and 
institutional base for a wide range of cooperation programmes with this huge region is evident.  
For the future this invites the prospect of the EU adopting a double strategy in its pre-accession 
programmes of cooperation with Turkey, which involves addressing Turkey’s own modernisation 
needs and the needs of the neighbouring states. It is now in any case the intention of the EU through 
its European Neighbourhood policy to seek ways of progressive and partial integration of 
neighbouring states in line with European norms, standards and operating policies. Turkey thus offers 
the opportunity for the EU to obtain synergies and economies of scale in combining these two strategic 
developments alongside each other.  
Concretely this could mean that the EU’s multiple programmes of assistance (PHARE, TACIS, 
MEDA and the future Neighbourhood instrument) could have operational centres and programmes in 
Turkey that could use many of the same institutional bases. This could concern many of the standard 
categories of programmes for good governance, media, human rights, police cooperation and technical 
cooperation in a wide range of economic and public policy domains. The EU’s technical cooperation 
programmes in Central Asia have suffered from a lack of solid, experienced institutional facilities 
functioning in either of the regions’ main languages (Russian or Turkic).  
5.2  Regulating the movement of people 
The official EU doctrine for candidates negotiating accession is that they should become compliant 
with EU and Schengen visa and border-management rules as quickly as they can, and that new 
member states shall not have opt-out possibilities for any EU policy. Among the ten newly acceding 
states, none negotiated or sought derogations from these policies. Nevertheless, the EU’s rules respect 
national competence for part of the visa field, notably for long-term visas and residence permits. The 
main pressure for special border regimes in the context of the recent enlargement came from Russia on 
behalf of Kaliningrad, and the EU has negotiated elements of facilitated transit for this region in 
coordination with Lithuania. The new member states bordering Ukraine reluctantly adopted the 
restrictive measures required by the EU, and these have indeed greatly reduced the number of border 
crossings (by 90% for Poland and 70% for Slovakia). But the overwhelming priority given to EU 
accession meant that there were no strong pressures for derogations.  
The present position of the Turkish government is indeed to become Schengen-compliant as soon as 
possible after the beginning of accession negotiations, in principle by the end of 2005. It appears to be 
following the Polish model of not wanting to raise difficulties in relation to the EU acquis, fearful that 
this may be used as a reason or excuse for delay in the negotiation process, or for acceding with what 
is sometimes called ‘second class’ membership of the Union. Turkey is thus concentrating on building 
up its reputation as a state that will achieve high standards of border security.  
In practice, however, the EU has an external border regime that has considerable exceptions and 
graduations already, with more under consideration. The UK and Ireland are not part of the Schengen 
system, so travellers crossing between these member states and the Schengen area are subject to 
frontier controls. Third-country nationals require separate visas for Schengen and non-Schengen 
states. On the other hand several non-member states are fully part of the Schengen area and it has 
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recently been agreed that Switzerland will join Norway and Iceland in this category. The new member 
states for their part have had to become Schengen-compliant with respect to visa policies for third-
country nationals, but their internal EU borders, for example between Poland and Germany, will not 
be abolished for a considerable (and today unknown) number of years. Russia has negotiated a special 
facilitated regime for the transit of Russians between Kaliningrad and mainland Russia, and is 
negotiating further ‘visa facilitation’ measures. The European Commission has recently proposed 
special measures for local border traffic for residents living within 50 kilometres of the EU’s external 
borders. Spain has special arrangements for its two North African territories (Ceuta and Melilla), 
which are enclaves in Morocco. It is to be expected that further special regimes will have to be 
developed for the Western Balkans when Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia accede as members. 
All of these exceptions to the standard Schengen regime amount to saying that the EU in practice has 
been progressively establishing a graduated rather than strictly unitary external border regime for the 
movement of people. Although the doctrine addressed to the candidate states is a rigid one of no 
derogations or opt-outs, the EU’s actual policy has become much more complex and subtle. The 
special features of the Turkish case therefore warrant careful consideration.  
The most notable feature of the Turkish case is its exceptional degree of openness to all its neighbours, 
which has accompanied policies of active cooperation involving big movements of tourists, traders, 
business people and students. But virtually all of these states are on the EU’s obligatory visa list, with 
further rules that require that the visas be obtained from consulates rather than at border crossings 
(ruling out Turkey’s present port-of-entry sticker system). Naturally, the current priority concern of 
combating terrorism and illegal trafficking reinforces the arguments for strict border controls. Turkey 
is already reforming the organisation of its border security services in line with European norms. But 
this concern for security need not be inconsistent with measures for the pre-accession period that aim 
at minimising the negative effects of stricter border regimes.  
Two categories of measures could be considered by the EU to be in its interests as well as those of 
Turkey. First and easiest are questions of sequencing the introduction of more restrictive visa policies. 
The EU is already negotiating with Russia on the subject of facilitated visa regimes, perhaps for 
priority categories of people such as students and participants in official cooperation programmes. 
Further, some countries in the EU’s neighbourhood may in due course qualify for visa-free access to 
the EU. The EU is beginning its own internal negotiations over the facilitated, local border-traffic 
regime. Where the EU itself is considering selective liberalisation measures, a candidate state should 
not be expected to tighten its regime, only to reverse this if the EU liberalises later, especially when 
the time horizon for accession is a long one. For example, Turkey should not be required to become 
fully Schengen-compliant until shortly before it can fully enter into the Schengen area itself (complete 
with the abolition of frontier checks), which would be many years from now (but this would require a 
change of current EU policy as and when accession negotiations begin).  
Second and more fundamentally, is whether it would be in both the EU’s and Turkey’s interests to 
have a variant of the UK’s Schengen opt-out regime. Turkey in this case would be entitled to continue 
to admit third-country nationals – at least from some of the neighbouring states with whom it is 
important to retain openness – with a less restrictive visa regime than that of the Schengen area. For 
example, there could be a strengthening of the security features of the present system of issuing sticker 
visas obtained at the port of entry. In this case, the frontier controls would remain between Turkey and 
Bulgaria and Greece by land, or between Turkey and all EU ports and airports, most notably for third-
country nationals. Turkish citizens would pass these frontiers freely with passports, exactly as UK or 
Irish citizens travel freely in and out of the Schengen area. Turkey already wants to tighten security 
around its external borders for the same security reasons that apply to the EU. Yet a certain degree of 
differentiation could help Turkey to continue to serve as an important open country to the states of the 
former Soviet Union and the Middle East. The central EU territory would thus be protected by a two-
tier frontier regime on both Turkey’s external and internal frontiers for the movement of third-country 
nationals, while Turkish citizens would have the normal freedom of movement and citizenship rights 
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5.3  Security and defence 
Turkey spends 2.4% of its GDP on military expenditures, compared with an average of 2% for the rest 
of NATO’s European members. Turkey’s military forces are by far the largest in NATO’s European 
contingent by number of personnel, accounting for a quarter of the total, with 514,000 enrolled (but 
with a large number of conscripts – 391,000). This compares with 210,000 from the UK, 260,000 from 
France and 296,000 from Germany. Turkey has also a substantial gendarmerie of 150,000, some of 
whom are effectively elite military troops. More specifically, Turkey has a significant cadre of career 
NCOs, with considerable combat experience in difficult terrains. Compared with other NATO 
members such as the UK and France, Turkey has limited strategic lift capacity. Nevertheless, it has 
been most willing to deploy its assets. As of 2003, Turkey had sizeable contingents in the ISAF in 
Afghanistan (1,400 troops), in SFOR II in Bosnia (1,200 troops) and in KFOR in Kosovo (940 troops). 
In Northern Cyprus the Turkish garrison is huge (approximately 35-40,000 troops). 
Turkey is actively involved in NATO’s adaptation to its new challenges. Turkey has established the 
headquarters of 3rd Corps in Istanbul as a High Readiness Force (Land) HQ. Additionally, one of the 
two air component commands in the new NATO command structure (CC-Air HQ) will be located in 
İzmir in August 2004. Turkey has signed military cooperation and training agreements with 45 
nations. In this regard Turkey makes an extensive use of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
programme, with training support for the partner states. Turkey also undertakes training programmes 
in the military facilities of the Turkish armed forces on a bilateral basis, free of charge. The total 
number of personnel trained by Turkey amounts to almost 30,000, of which about a half were trained 
in the home countries by Turkish training experts and about half in Turkey. Turkish training support 
within the NATO and partnership mechanisms are provided by the Turkish PfP Training Centre in 
Ankara, which was established in 1998 and was the first such centre recognised by NATO. Since its 
inception, the Turkish PfP Training Centre has trained more than 3,600 personnel from 50 NATO, 
PfP, and Mediterranean Dialogue countries. In addition, the Centre has established mobile training 
teams, which have provided training for about 1,000 personnel from a dozen countries. 
In Afghanistan Turkey has participated in all phases of the ISAF operations from the beginning. 
During the ISAF-II operation in 2002-03, Turkey undertook the leadership of the international force, 
contributing 1,500 personnel and also operating the Kabul international airport. Turkey handed over 
the leadership to Germany and Holland in February 2003, but continues its participation with an 
infantry company and other resources including three Black Hawk helicopters.  
In October 2002 the EU reached an agreement with Turkey and other non-EU NATO member states 
concerning these countries’ possible participation in EU military operations and the EU’s use of 
NATO military assets and capabilities in such operations. This agreement took two years to negotiate, 
and was blocked for some time for two reasons of importance to Turkey. First, Turkey sought the 
maximum participation in the shaping if not decision-making by the EU. An elaborate consultative 
process was established involving the associated states in the workings of the EU’s Political and 
Security Committee and Military Committee. Second, there were sensitive concerns over military 
aspects of the Greek-Turkish relationship in general, as well as the Cypriot conflict in particular. It 
was agreed that the EU would in no circumstances use its military against a NATO ally and that 
NATO would in no circumstance act against the EU. The final deal reached at the December 2002 
Copenhagen European Council also provided for the exclusion of Cyprus (and Malta) as non-NATO 
or PfP countries from possible ESDP operations. Overall this difficult negotiation revealed the 
sensitivity in Turkey concerning the key difference between being a close associate versus a full 
member of the EU. 
A final area of possible and desirable cooperation concerns the sharing of intelligence. In June 2004, 
the EU announced that it would establish enhanced cooperation among its member states. Given that 
many of the targets of EU intelligence services have a Turkish connection (terrorism, narcotics and 
migrant trafficking, arms dealings and money laundering), cooperation with Turkish intelligence 
services would also be useful. In addition, Turkish intelligence has assets and contacts in some 
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would also require EU assistance to Turkish services (such as the gendarmerie, the police, customs 
and coastguard) to counter traffickers attempting to reach the EU via Turkey. This would be the 
necessary EU step so as to prevent Turkey from acting alone as the gatekeeper of Europe.  
6. Conclusions 
This paper has explored whether the idea of integrating Turkish and EU foreign and security polices 
holds out the prospect of something important and valuable for both parties. Would Turkey be an asset 
or a liability? Our conclusions are unambiguously positive. 
This result does, however, depend on the EU’s level of ambition for its foreign and security policy. 
Does the EU aspire to become a major actor in the nearby southern and eastern neighbourhoods, or 
does it prefer to retreat into itself behind the most secure possible external borders? If the EU truly 
aspires to play a stabilising, pacifying and modernising role in its neighbourhood beyond mere token 
actions, then the incorporation of Turkey into the common external policy offers the prospect of real 
advantages. In the contrary case it would be consistent for the EU to reject Turkey’s future 
membership once and for all. Yet in that scenario the EU would run the risk of destabilising Turkey, 
which could mean adding to the chaos of the wider neighbourhood.  
Turkey’s EU accession stands to be of comparable importance for the EU’s emerging foreign and 
security policy as the recent accession of the ten new member states put together, if not more so. 
Turkey is almost completely surrounded by a set of regions that represent the EU’s prime security 
concerns, from the residual instability of the Balkans to the west, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Iraq and 
Iran to the east, and Israel-Palestine and the Mediterranean to the south. The Turkish accession would 
mark the end of the EU’s enlargement to the east, while at the same time opening new dimensions to 
the EU’s relationship with the Middle East and Eurasia to the south and east – a region that is unstable 
and unpredictable.  
The potential advantages for the EU in integrating Turkey as a foreign and security policy actor are 
several. Objective factors lie in concrete logistical and geographical advantages, coupled with military 
capabilities and civilian human resources that can be readily deployed in the Eurasian and Middle 
Eastern neighbourhoods. More subjective but perhaps even more important are the prospects for the 
Turkish experience to be viewed as a positive precedent by its neighbours. This general statement has 
a number of versions, some of which have been recently tried but failed (e.g., the pan-Turkic 
experiment in Central Asia in the early 1990s). Other variants are also likely to provoke adverse 
reactions, such as over-selling the Turkish model of multi-party democracy and secularism in parts of 
the Arab world. Not only does Turkey’s democracy still have important shortcomings, but Turkey’s 
Arab neighbours, in view of the legacy of Ottoman rule, react adversely to arguments suggesting their 
emulation of Turkey’s political and economic system.  
More subtle arguments, however, seem full of promise. The Turkish case suggests that the values of 
democracy, human rights, the rule of law and secularism are not specific to any particular culture or 
religion. On the contrary, these are universal values with no geographical, cultural or religious 
limitations. Rather than representing a static model of democracy, the continuing process of Turkey’s 
democratisation could act as a source of inspiration to its neighbours. The same is also true of the 
gradual transformation of Turkey’s security and foreign policy culture. While in the past Turkish 
foreign policy had focussed on the importance of military security and balance-of-power politics, it 
now increasingly appreciates the value of civilian instruments of law, economics and diplomacy, as 
well as multilateral settings in which to pursue its aims. Related to this, the Turkish example 
demonstrates the value of European integration as a key external anchor to domestic processes of 
modernisation.  
The final point concerns the EU’s own model, recalling our initial contrast of the sharply delimited 
Euro-federal model versus one of differentiated forms in relation to its outer edges or neighbourhoods. 
Turkey’s EU accession and integration would vindicate the EU’s ambitions to represent an inclusive 
project and a multi-cultural community of values. If the EU and Turkey were to make the best use of 34 | EMERSON & TOCCI 
 
their joint opportunities in the foreign policy domain, Turkey would build on the advantages of its 
comparative openness as well as proximity to the Middle Eastern and Eurasian neighbourhoods. The 
EU and Turkey could thus devise an original blend of openness towards their southern and eastern 
neighbours, with the model of a graduated external border of the EU. Nevertheless Turkey would need 
to be reassured that this would not in any way deprive it of normal political rights as a future member 
state. To have a graduated border regime that adds value is not to be confused with the negative 
connotations of a second-class member state.  
Finally, an integration of EU and Turkish strategic cultures in the context of the present turmoil in the 
Middle East and transatlantic discord over Iraq could carry a message to Washington as well, 
supporting a shift back towards multilateralism, moderation and the rule of law. 
Our conclusions in viewing Turkey as a potential asset to the EU’s foreign and security policies can be 
distilled into two terms used in military security studies: bridgehead and spearhead. In the present 
context these words have meaning in terms of the civil values and the objectives of an expanding 
European Union. The democratising Turkey would be the bridgehead of a modern, multi-cultural 
Europe right up to and alongside the ideological chaos and violence of the neighbourhood beyond. Its 
civilian, military and human resources could be integrated with those of the EU and serve as a 
spearhead of the EU’s soft and not-so-soft power projection into the region. 
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